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Introduction 
 
 Borderline personality disorder is one of the most controversial disorders in the 
contemporary psychopathological scenario. Despite its prevalence both in clinical settings 
and in nonclinical ones, it falls far behind other major psychiatric disorders in awareness and 
research, remaining strongly stigmatized by mental health professionals themselves who want 
to avoid situations that are problematic by nature. Several consequences result from this 
“sidelining”. The most serious one is that still little is known (or, rather, still little is the 
general consensus) about BPD core psychopathology. 
This thesis aims to fill this gap, proposing a new, psychopathological-dynamic model 
for understanding BPD that tries to describe the subjective experience of these patients, from 
basic lived experience to symptomatic disturbances level through here-and-now lived 
experience. In more detail, Chapter 1 will introduce borderline personality disorder from a 
general point of view. BPD will be described from different perspectives: first of all, 
epidemiological data related to the disorder will be presented; secondly, use, misuse, and 
overuse of the borderline diagnosis will be discussed; thirdly, the clinical core of BPD will be 
examined; fourthly, a multifactorial etiology will be highlighted.  
Chapter 2 will present the new, psychopathological-dynamic model for understanding 
BPD from a theoretical point of view. Firstly, the model will be described as a whole; after 
that, each part of the model will be described in detail, from the psychopathological features 
at the basic lived experience (background dysphoria and negative interpersonal disposition) 
to the variety of symptomatic disturbances (divided into organizing and disorganizing 
pathways), through temporary affect depending on situational triggers at the here-and-now 
lived experience (situational dysphoria). 
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Chapter 3 will present the first empirical investigation of the new, 
psychopathological-dynamic model for understanding BPD in a sample of borderline patients 
(and a group of healthy controls). Findings will be presented according to two steps: I) 
development and analysis of the psychometric properties of the Situational Dysphoria Scale 
(SITDS); II) validation of the whole psychopathological-dynamic model using structural 
equation modeling analysis. Results will be finally discussed in order to highlight clinical and 
theoretical implications of the study as well as directions for future research. 
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Chapter 1 
Borderline personality disorder up to here 
 
 
1.1 A view from above 
Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is one of the most enigmatic disorders in 
contemporary psychopathology. On one hand, it is one of the most frequently diagnosed 
conditions in the area of personality disorders. For example, the prevalence of BPD was 
estimated to be 10% in outpatient settings, 15%-20% in inpatient settings, and 0.5%-1.4% in 
the general population (Gunderson & Links, 2008; ten Have et al., 2016; Trull, Stepp, & 
Solan, 2007), with a gender ratio of 3 females to 1 male (Oldham, 2005; Oldham et al., 
2001). This, however, is not supported by some recent findings showing an equal prevalence 
of BPD among males and females (Torgersen, 2005; Torgersen, Kringlen, & Kramer, 2001). 
In addition, at least 50% of chronically suicidal patients with four or more annual visits to a 
psychiatric emergency service are diagnosed with BPD; these patients account for more than 
12% of all psychiatric emergency service visits, with a lifetime risk of suicide between 3% 
and 10% (Gunderson & Links, 2008).  
On the other hand, BPD is far behind other major psychiatric disorders in terms of the 
awareness and research, due to its complexity, multiple presentations and serious difficulties 
experienced by mental health professionals in dealing with it. For example, although BPD is 
thought to occur globally, there has been little epidemiological research into the disorder 
outside the Western world (National Collaborating Centre for Mental Health, 2009). In this 
sense, Gunderson (2009) stated that “Borderline personality disorder is to psychiatry what 
psychiatry is to medicine” (p. 536), suggesting that BPD is strongly stigmatized even in the 
mental health context. Several authors have described various manifestations of BPD over the 
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last fifty years (Bradley, Conklin, & Westen, 2005; Lenzenweger, Clarkin, Yeomans, 
Kernberg, & Levy, 2008; Linehan, 1993; Zanarini, 1993). Among them, M. Schmideberg 
(1959) has proposed the most succinct portrait of BPD, describing it as being essentially 
stable in its instability. The text below addresses several aspects of this instability (Box 1.1).  
  
Box 1.1. Several aspects of instability in BPD 
 Conceptualization as a syndrome, category or structural organization  
 “Identity diffusion” 
 Rapidly changing and highly variable emotions 
 Oscillation of impulsivity between external and internal manifestations 
 Transient impairment of reality testing 
 
 
Firstly, instability is reflected in the way in which BPD has been conceptualized. It is 
primarily an entity located between other clinical entities, generally between neurosis and 
psychosis. BPD has also been conceived of as a syndrome, nosographic category, and 
structural organization. Finally, numerous symptoms have been proposed to characterize 
BPD, with many possible combinations legitimizing the BPD diagnosis. This variety of 
clinical presentations allows borderline patients to move across very different levels of 
mental functioning over time.  
Secondly, instability refers to identity in BPD. The borderline patient is unable to 
develop a stable and consistent image of himself/herself as a person and is dominated by an 
inner sense of emptiness, which results in basic uncertainties in all areas of life. Indeed, BPD 
was described as the “syndrome of identity diffusion” by Kernberg (1975, 1984). 
Accordingly, the borderline identity has also been defined as “liquid” (Acquarini, 2006), not 
in the sense that it tends to adapt to the shape of a container but in the sense of fluidity 
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continuously in search of a container (Stanghellini, 2008). The container, however, invariably 
turns out to be disappointing, opening the way to the series of relational short circuits. 
Thirdly, instability affects emotions in BPD, as they are rapidly changing and highly 
variable. The borderline patient is a very sensitive “barometer” who reacts to minimal 
variations of environmental pressure and becomes overwhelmed by turbulent emotions, such 
as depression tinged with irritability (dysphoria), anger, excitement and anxiety, and 
accompanying phenomena, such as emptiness, boredom, and omnipotence. As these 
emotions appear, just as quickly they disappear, leaving behind the rubble of the continuity of 
the self and disastrous effects on the relationships. 
Fourthly, instability pertains to impulsivity. The borderline impulsivity continuously 
oscillates between its external and internal manifestations. The former are reflected in risk-
taking behaviors and stormy interpersonal relationships, whereas the latter are typically 
represented by acts of self-harm. The borderline patient is torn between exhibiting outward 
impulsivity and thereby exporting his/her interior drama and directing his/her impulsivity 
inward and wounding himself/herself as a means of regulating intolerable emotions. 
Finally, instability affects the relationship with reality in BPD. In the borderline 
psychopathology – it is said – reality testing is preserved. This is true at a phenomenological-
descriptive level. However, the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria for BPD refer to transient 
impairments of reality testing and reversible paranoid breaks. Literature and clinical 
observation have highlighted how these phenomena in borderline patients are not “real” 
psychotic experiences, being described as quasi-psychotic experiences, quasi-delusions 
delusion-like beliefs, pseudo-hallucinations and quasi-hallucinations (Zanarini, Gunderson, 
Frankenburg, & Chauncey, 1990). In sum, it is as if the borderline patient is neither able to be 
depressed (because his depression is described as “atypical”) nor delusional and hallucinatory 
in a full sense. He is always on the edge, “in-between”, hung to his “stable instability”. 
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Due to this pervasive instability, the borderline patient can be seen as a real migrant in 
psychopathology (Rossi Monti & D’Agostino, 2009):  as he/she cannot “fix” himself/herself 
to a certain point of his/her trajectory, he/she constantly moves from one domain of 
psychopathology to another. In the next sections we will see how this basic characteristic 
makes BPD very difficult to understand and manage in the clinical setting. 
 
1.2  The borderline diagnosis: use, misuse and overuse 
1.2.1 A problem of the construct  
One of the main reasons behind inadequate use of the BPD diagnosis concerns the 
construct of “borderline” itself. What do we mean when we say “borderline”? The answer is 
not straightforward and points to at least eight meanings (Rossi Monti & D’Agostino, 2009) 
(Box 1.2). 
 
Box 1.2. Different meanings of “borderline”  
 Kernberg’s borderline personality organization 
 DSM-5 borderline personality disorder 
 High vulnerability to psychosis  
 “Soft” version of bipolar II disorder 
 Propensity to impulsive actions 
 Reference to early traumatic experiences 
 Clinicians’ “waste basket” 
 “Hopeless” cases  
 
 
The first meaning of “borderline” refers to the “borderline personality organization”. 
This term, introduced by Otto Kernberg (1975, 1984), extends far beyond the DSM-5 BPD. 
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In fact, according to Kernberg, the DSM-5 criteria for BPD delineate a clinical entity that is 
based on superficial symptoms, without referring to the deep personality organization 
underlying those symptoms. Personality organization, instead, is far more important to 
Kernberg because it encompasses basic personality characteristics and levels of functioning, 
whereby symptoms are only one of its aspects. Kernberg postulated three personality 
organizations: neurotic, psychotic and borderline. He described the following characteristics 
of the borderline personality organization: a) identity disturbance (“the syndrome of identity 
diffusion”); b) primitive defense mechanisms (i.e., primitive idealization, projective 
identification and splitting); c) intact, but fragile reality testing. This personality organization 
is the background of several DSM-5 personality disorders, comprising narcissistic, histrionic, 
antisocial, schizoid, and paranoid personality disorders, in addition to BPD. Moreover, 
according to Kernberg, there are two “types” of borderline personality organization: I) “high-
functioning”, which is similar to the neurotic organization; II) “low-functioning”, which is 
closer to the psychotic organization.  
The second meaning of “borderline” has to do with a specific clinical syndrome. 
Clinical psychiatry has tried to describe this syndrome relying on behavioral symptoms and 
in accordance with the epistemological assumptions of the contemporary nosography. From 
this point of view, the DSM-5 posits that BPD comprises nine symptoms, with the diagnostic 
criteria for BPD met when at least five of these nine symptoms are present. The nine 
symptoms include all the typical characteristic of this personality disorder: pervasive 
instability in relationships, self-image, and affects, marked impulsivity, frantic efforts to 
avoid abandonment, instable and intense relationships, identity disturbances, impulsivity, 
recurrent suicidal behavior or self-injury, affective instability, chronic feelings of emptiness, 
inappropriate and intense anger, and transient stress-related paranoid ideation. 
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The third meaning of “borderline” is tied to the historical origin of the term, as being 
related to schizophrenia. In the 1940s, a series of atypical schizophrenic syndromes, 
sometimes referred to as  “pseudoneurotic schizophrenia” (Hoch & Polatin, 1949), were 
described. This psychopathological constellation denoted a neurotic appearance and high 
vulnerability to psychosis, with the latter manifesting as acute, brief psychotic episodes, 
always occurring in response to the specific, environmental triggers. In this sense, the 
borderline psychopathology was seen as the result of a high vulnerability to schizophrenic 
psychosis, which could explode under the particular circumstances, thus breaking the 
neurotic shell. This historical root of the borderline concept keeps BPD tied to the 
schizophrenic spectrum, although the two are now considered unrelated.  
The forth meaning of “borderline” pertains to the affective spectrum (Akiskal, 1981). 
The typical affective instability of borderline patients (i.e., mood oscillations, high frequency 
of depressive experiences, a constantly “bad” mood, moments of excitement, and so on) has 
led many clinics to hypothesize a link between BPD and mood disorders or even to consider 
BPD as a “soft” version of bipolar II disorder. This idea stems from both the assumption that 
mood swings/affective instability always reflects bipolarity and that depressive experiences 
of borderline patients are similar to those of patients with major depressive disorder. 
Actually, the first ones are “atypical” depressive experiences that have little to do with major 
depressive disorder, being a characteristic aspect of this personality pathological pattern 
(Gunderson & Phillips, 1991; Paris, 2004; Stanley & Wilson, 2006).  
The fifth meaning of “borderline” focuses on the propensity to impulsive action. 
Impulsivity is derived from the need to immediately give vent to distressing internal states 
that cannot be tolerated. In addition, impulsivity in BPD often has an aggressive valence, 
regardless of whether it is directed towards the others or the self. The hypothesis of the 
possible link between BPD and impulse spectrum disorders is derived from the idea that 
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impulsivity is the core of the borderline experience. This hypothetical realm of 
psychopathology comprises impulsive actions such as outbursts of anger, impulsive suicidal 
and parasuicidal acts), substance addiction and antisocial behaviors (Zanarini, 1993). 
The sixth meaning of “borderline” refers to the possible affiliation of BPD with 
another spectrum: that of traumatic disorders. The hypothesized link between BPD and 
traumatic disorders pertains to the relationship of borderline psychopathology with traumatic 
experiences in early childhood, attachment disturbances, and dissociative defensive 
mechanisms used as a reaction to trauma (Herman, Perry, & Van der Kolk, 1989; Herman & 
Van der Kolk, 1987; Ogata et al., 1990; Stone, 1990; Zanarini, Gunderson, Marino, Schwartz, 
& Frankenburg, 1989). The most frequent traumatic experiences in patients with BPD are 
sexual abuse or violence (or witnessing such violence), abandonment conditions or protracted 
neglect (emotional and/or physical), chronic unpredictability of parents’ reactions, chaotic 
family setting and severe depressive episodes of the mother that make emotional tuning with 
the child inadequate. However, traumatic experiences do not necessarily precede the 
development of borderline psychopathology because of the lack of a direct relationship 
between traumatic experiences in childhood and BPD in adulthood (Fossati, Madeddu, & 
Maffei, 1999; Meares, 2000; Rutter, 1994; Wallerstein, 1994; Westen, 1990). 
The seventh meaning of “borderline” has to do with the practice, very much in vogue 
among some clinicians, of using BPD as a “waste basket” in which they can put anything that 
does not conform to the existing nosographic patterns. While the highest aspiration of the 
nosography is to have entities “neatly combed”, whereby every entity fits a particular 
nosographic category, no psychiatric classification has achieved this objective. And this is 
mainly due to the problem of intermediate cases. These are the psychopathological forms that 
do not belong neither to a nosographic category nor to another, but rather present elements of 
both the first and the second category (i.e., schizoaffective disorders, mixed states, and so 
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on); they function as real “nosographic disorganizers” preventing the crystallization of every 
classification of mental disorders (Rossi Monti, 1996) and suggesting the need to replace 
discontinuity with continuity in the nosographic context.  
The eighth meaning of “borderline” refers to a need for labeling cases in which 
clinicians’ efforts are useless or even ruinous. For example, this happens when severely ill 
patients with personality disturbance need to be hospitalized or even when they refuse further 
psychotherapy; in such cases, the borderline diagnosis is used to justify therapeutic failure, 
implying that BPD patients inevitably have difficulties with interpersonal relationships. This 
difficulty does not regard the possibility to be in relationship with others but rather the fact 
that these patients tend to repeat consolidated relational patterns modeled on the idealization-
devaluation-abandonment circuit. These circuits make the relationships fail and the people 
that are in strict relationships with borderline patients “burn out”. However, it must be 
remembered that the taking charge of these kinds of patients is a complex and difficult task 
that puts the clinician in contact with a series of emotions, which are very difficult to manage. 
In this sense, every failure must be considered as due to the therapeutic dyad, and not 
attributed just to the psychopathological characteristics of the patient. 
1.2.2 A problem of the assessment 
Among the eight meanings of “borderline” we described in the previous paragraph, 
the second meaning that refers to BPD as a specific, DSM-defined syndrome is arguably the 
most frequently encountered in clinical practice. This is due to two factors. First, the DSM 
espouses an atheoretical approach, which allows clinicians to use the diagnosis, regardless of 
their theoretical orientation and geographical setting. Second, the categorical approach of the 
DSM allows clinicians to make a diagnosis of BPD in a simple way, if the required number 
of criteria is present. However, these characteristics of the DSM approach also account for 
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some of the main problems with the diagnosis of BPD. The key issue here is that the DSM 
has been designed and developed to classify the disorders and not individuals. Consequently, 
the DSM necessarily adopts the perspective of having-something-in-front instead of being-
with-someone (Rossi Monti & Foresti, 2005). 
These two perspectives represent positions around which the whole psychiatry field 
oscillates (Cargnello, 1980). Accordingly, psychiatric assessment approaches the other as 
someone to have in front of or someone to be with and enter into a therapeutic relationship 
with. In the former case, the disorder is seen as something without a personal meaning, 
detached from the life history and internal events in the person, with discontinuity between 
the life before the disorder and life with the disorder. In the latter case, the disorder is seen as 
having a personal meaning, with life events related to the disorder and disorder being 
integrated into a life trajectory (Rossi Monti & Foresti, 2005). 
While the DSM approach of having-something-in-front may be helpful to classify 
disorders for research purposes, it reveals its inadequacy when relational dysfunctions need to 
be assessed. This is especially the case with BPD, because of the need to be-with individuals 
who tend to develop destructive relationships with others. In fact, if the neurotic patient 
experiences the conflict in his/her internal world and the psychotic patient tries to modify 
reality via delusional fantasy, the borderline patient experiences – in reality and in 
relationships – those difficulties that he/she cannot tolerate within himself/herself. “The 
borderline personality pathology literally boils the relationship” (Rossi Monti & Foresti, 
2005, p. 141).  
In this sense, BPD is a disturbing disorder par excellence. And, it has a disturbing 
effect on the clinician.  In fact, the turbulence and unpredictably of the action, typical of the 
borderline patient who has some difficulty in mentalizing sufferance, make the clinician work 
primarily with these reality elements and experience himself/herself the disturbing effect of 
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the patient. But, if the borderline patient expresses his/her “borderlineity”, so to speak, 
through the relationship with the clinician, how can the latter understand the former in all 
his/her complexity through a DSM diagnosis that completely ignores the relational dimension 
and subsequently ignores the aspect of being-with-someone? 
This is a significant issue. A possible solution is to use the metaphor of “double-face 
overcoats” (Rossi Monti & Foresti, 2005) when considering the DSM criteria. Double-face 
overcoats are regular coats from one side but, if turned, they become waterproof from the 
other side, and can be worn only one way or the other.  Regardless of how double-face 
overcoats are worn, their owner is aware of their other side, i.e., their other, “hidden” identity 
that coexists with the external one. In other words, double-face overcoats continue being both 
a regular and a waterproof coat, although on the surface they are either one or the other. 
Applying the metaphor of double-face overcoats to the DSM diagnosis of BPD, the 
descriptive-objective aspects (DSM-5 criteria) can be combined with the experienced-
subjective elements (representing a perspective of being-with-someone). Therefore, every 
DSM-5 criterion can be seen both in the regular coat version (the patient’s symptoms) and in 
the waterproof coat version (the clinician’s experience of the patient’s symptoms) (Box 1.3). 
Wearing the patient’s regular coat, the nine DSM-5 criteria describe BPD via fears of 
abandonment, difficult interpersonal relationships, uncertainty about self-image and identity, 
impulsive behaviors, self-injurious behaviors, emotional instability, feelings of emptiness, 
difficulty controlling intense anger and transient suspiciousness or disconnectedness. 
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Box 1.3.  “Regular” and “waterproof coat” versions of DSM-5 BPD criteria 
 
“Regular coat” version of DSM-5 criteria 
(The patient’s symptoms) 
“Waterproof coat” version of DSM-5 criteria 
(The clinician’s experience of the patient’s symptoms) 
1. Fears of abandonment 1. Feeling pushed to comfort the patient every 
time there is a break in clinical work 
2. Difficult interpersonal relationships 2. Feeling dragged into a roller coaster alternation 
between patient’s idealization and devaluation 
3. Uncertainty about self-image or identity 3. Being unable to have a clear idea of the patient 
4. Impulsive behaviors 4. Feeling helpless by patient’s tendency to 
respond with immediate, poorly planned actions 
5. Self-injurious behaviors 5. Feeling puzzled as to how to respond to 
patient’s self-harm 
6. Emotional instability 6. Being at the mercy of patient’s rapidly shifting 
feelings of despair, impotence, failure or rage 
7. Feelings of emptiness 7. Feeling lost in patient’s emptiness 
8. Difficulty controlling intense anger 8. Feeling angry due to a sense of being 
manipulated or used by the patient 
9. Transient suspiciousness/disconnectedness 9. Having quasi-paranoid thoughts, such as “is 
he/she [the patient] registering what I’m saying?” 
 
 
Wearing the clinician’s waterproof coat, the nine DSM-5 criteria for BPD correspond 
to the following phenomena from clinician’s perspective:  
 Feeling pushed to comfort the patient every time there is a break in clinical work.  
 Feeling dragged into a roller coaster alternation between patient’s idealization and 
devaluation.  
 Being unable to have a clear idea of who the patient is.  
 Feeling helpless by patient’s tendency to respond with immediate, poorly planned actions.  
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 Feeling puzzled as to how to respond to patient’s self-harm.  
 Being at the mercy of patient’s rapidly shifting feelings of despair, impotence, failure, 
irritability or rage.  
 Feeling lost in patient’s emptiness and desolation.  
 Often feeling angry due to a sense of being manipulated or used by the patient.  
 Sometimes having quasi-paranoid thoughts, such as “is he/she [the patient] registering 
what I’m saying?” (Rossi Monti & Foresti, 2005). 
1.2.3 A problem of the context 
A problem strictly related to that of assessment has to do with the care context. In 
fact, the diagnosis of BPD may be overused or underused depending on the treatment setting 
where it is made. The former may occur when there is little time for a thorough assessment 
and clinicians are under pressure to make an early diagnosis, often to justify the cost to a 
service director or insurance company. According to Gunderson and Links (2008), “it is 
convenient – as well as usually correct – to identify anyone who has carried out repeated self-
destructive acts or who is an inappropriately angry young woman as ‘301.83’ (the DSM 
diagnostic code for BPD)” (p. 22). In contrast, the diagnosis of BPD may be underutilized in 
settings such as public hospitals, inpatient units and outpatient clinics, where the 
psychopathology outside of the personality disorders realm tends to be more emphasized.  
There are other examples of an inappropriate use of the diagnosis of BPD. For 
example, some psychiatrists believe that psychiatric diagnoses should be based on 
neurobiology and that primary purpose of the diagnosis is to help with the choice of 
pharmacological treatment. Such psychiatrists are likely to underuse the borderline diagnosis 
because it is not based on neurobiology and because it is unable to provide a guide to 
pharmacological treatment. In contrast, some mental health professionals are quick to use the 
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borderline diagnosis as a pejorative label, when the patients are frustrating or annoying them. 
In some cases, the diagnosis of BPD reflects a therapeutic despair or nihilism. But, as 
Vaillant (1992) states, if we do not like a patient – a phenomenon that corresponds to hostile 
countertransference – that is not a sufficient reason to make a borderline diagnosis; rather, it 
is a reason to wonder about our reaction. 
A tendency over the last 20 years to consider BPD as part of the bipolar spectrum 
(Zimmermann & Morgan, 2013) may be a consequence of these biases in the assessment of 
BPD, that are strictly related to the care context where the assessment is made. Paris (2012) 
refers to this tendency as a “fad”, with bipolar disorders becoming more “popular” (i.e., more 
frequently diagnosed) than BPD largely because they are more likely to respond to 
pharmacological treatment. In other words, clinicians generally do not like diagnosing 
conditions that are perceived to be more difficult to treat, such as BPD.  
Another reason for favoring bipolar disorders over BPD can be found in the work of 
Akiskal and his colleagues (Perugi, Fornaro & Akiskal, 2011) who suggested that 
cyclothymia (i.e., affective instability) might account for the majority of BPD symptoms. As 
a consequence, it was proposed that BPD should be eliminated and transformed into 
“bipolarity”. Although there is an overlap between the symptoms of BPD and bipolar 
disorders, especially bipolar II disorder, the co-occurrence of these disorders is seen in a 
minority of patients. According to Gunderson et al. (2006), over 90% of BPD patients do not 
have an additional diagnosis of bipolar II disorder. Such findings do not support the notion 
that BPD should be encompassed by the broad concept of bipolarity.  
 Furthermore, there is evidence suggesting important differences in terms of etiology 
and treatment response between BPD and bipolar disorders, including bipolar II disorder 
(Leichsenring, Kruse, New, & Leweke, 2011). According to Parker (2011), there are several 
features that differentiate BPD from bipolar II disorder: a negative family history for bipolar 
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II disorder; onset in childhood or adolescence; preponderance of women in clinical settings; 
different personality patterns; emotion dysregulation rather than episodes of mood alteration; 
low response threshold to stressors; absence of melancholia or hypomania; lack of response 
to mood stabilizers. 
Other research suggests that a pattern of generalized impulsivity is the most important 
feature that distinguishes BPD from bipolar II disorder (Galione & Zimmerman, 2010; 
Wilson et al., 2007). Although suicidal behavior can be present in bipolar II disorder, self-
injury seems to be characteristic only of BPD (Paris, 2012), and it has been characterized as 
the “behavioral specialty” of BPD by some authors (Gunderson & Links, 2008). Besides, 
according to Zanarini, Gunderson, and Frankenburg (1990), about half of BPD patients 
present with micro-psychotic experiences (i.e., hearing voices) that are transient and usually 
occur under stress; patients with bipolar II disorder are unlikely to report such experiences. 
Yet another criterion for distinguishing between BPD and bipolar II disorder is their 
interpersonal style. The relationships of borderline patients tend to be both needy and instable 
and they start relationships rashly, often meet wrong people, become too attached to them 
and then quickly regret that. In contrast, bipolar patients’ poor judgment related to 
relationships is usually restricted to hypomanic episodes. 
In summary, BPD can be seen as a specific disorder, with a specific hereditary 
predisposition and specific risk factors, which presents with specific clinical features and has 
specific outcomes; it does not go into remission after administration of medications for 
bipolar II disorder, but responds to therapeutic methods developed for personality disorders; 
it may have a better prognosis compared to that of bipolar II disorder. If the clinicians knew 
all this, they would be less likely to make the diagnosis of bipolar disorder instead of BPD 
(Paris, 2012). 
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1.3  The “dark triad”: BPD clinical core 
In 2002, Paulhus and Williams, trying to clarify the literature on personality 
pathology, identified three predominant features: Machiavellianism (manipulative 
personality), narcissism, and psychopathy, calling them the “dark triad of personality”. We 
are using this designation to describe the BPD clinical core in an analogous way. Thus, we 
are postulating that the clinical core of BPD is characterized by three predominant features, 
considered here as the “dark triad” of BPD: affective dysregulation, relational dysregulation 
and behavioral dysregulation. These three “forms” of dysregulation overlap, that is, they are 
not separate from each other. This is largely based on the findings of the research into the 
structure of the BPD diagnostic criteria (Calvo et al., 2012; Clarkin, Hull, & Hart, 1993; 
Sanislow, Grilo, & Morey, 2002).  
1.3.1  Affective dysregulation 
Over the past decade, affective dysregulation (or emotion dysregulation) has become 
a very popular term in the psychiatric and clinical psychology literature and it has been 
described as a key component in a range of mental disorders. For this reason, it has also been 
called the “hallmark of psychopathology” (Beauchaine, Gatzke-Kopp, & Mead, 2007). 
However, many issues make this concept controversial. In our recent literature review 
(D’Agostino, Covanti, Rossi Monti, & Starcevic, 2016), we found a discrepancy between the 
widespread clinical use of affective dysregulation and inadequate conceptual status of this 
construct and reported the following five overlapping, not mutually exclusive dimensions of 
affective dysregulation: decreased emotional awareness, inadequate emotional reactivity, 
intense experience and expression of emotions, emotional rigidity and cognitive reappraisal 
difficulty. These dimensions characterize a number of psychiatric disorders in different 
proportions, with BPD seemingly more affected than other conditions.  
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A notion that affective dysregulation is a core feature of BPD is now shared by most 
authors. According to Linehan and other researchers (Carpenter & Trull, 2013; Linehan, 
1993; Linehan, Bohus, & Linch, 2007), affective dysregulation in BPD is essentially 
comprised of three components: a) heightened sensitivity to emotional stimuli; b) intense 
reactions to emotional stimuli; c) slow, delayed return to an emotional baseline. Going 
deeper, this sensitivity leads to experiencing negative affect across contexts and situations, 
which leads in turn to having a deficit in appropriate regulation strategies, that contributes to 
a tendency to engage in dysregulated behaviors in order to manage and reduce negative 
affect; the result of this four-component process is a “recursive pattern of emotion 
dysregulation” (Carpenter & Trull, 2013). 
Several researchers highlight that heightened sensitivity in BPD (also referred to as 
over-reactivity, although the two terms are not synonymous) is elicited by the negative 
stimuli (Gratz, Rosenthal, Tull, Lejuez, & Gunderson, 2010; Herpertz et al., 2000; 
Koenigsberg et al., 2010), especially those of an interpersonal and relational nature (Rossi 
Monti & D’Agostino, 2014). This is supported by studies that show that borderline patients 
are much quicker to recognize facial expressions of emotions, compared to clinical and non-
clinical control groups (Lynch et al., 2006); moreover, borderline patients are especially 
quick to recognize facial expressions of negative emotions and likely to interpret neutral 
facial expressions as angry or discontent (Domes, Schulze, & Herpertz, 2009). Neuroimaging 
studies show abnormal amygdala functioning (i.e., over-activation) in borderline patients, 
upon their exposure to highly charged emotional stimuli (Herpertz et al., 2001). 
Several authors think that the most important element in BPD is not negative 
affectivity such as depressive states and anxiety (Concklin, Bradley, & Westen, 2006) but 
affective instability or the constant oscillation between negative affective states (Rosenthal et 
al., 2008). This oscillation does not include all types of emotions, but predominantly fear and 
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anger. Goodman, Hazlett, New, Koenigsberg, and Siever (2009) have identified the 
oscillation between dysphoria and anger as the core of emotional instability in BPD, with this 
oscillation being particularly prominent in an interpersonal context. In fact, “it is the extreme 
sensitivity to context that generates […] the dynamic that provides the unique psychological 
signature for borderline personality disorder familiar to most clinicians” (Goodman et al., 
2009, p. 526).  
1.3.2 Relational dysregulation 
Relational dysregulation is the second important feature of BPD. This term indicates 
the typical relationship that borderline patients establish with others: emotionally turbulent, 
fiery because of the intensity of the emotions involved, very discontinuous, stormy, and 
constantly on the verge of rupture or interruption (Rossi Monti & D’Agostino, 2014). In 
particular, the impossibility of understanding the other is the essential core of the relational 
difficulties of the borderline patients. They have great difficulty – especially in situations of 
strong emotional arousal – to understand mental states of the others, the reasons behind their 
behavior and the possibility that a person who loves them, under some circumstances, can 
hurt them (Maffei, 2008). In this sense, the others, so loved, considered special and idealized 
by BPD patients, become suddenly the worst persecutors, thus being devalued even in 
situations that could ordinarily be considered “neutral”. In summary, in these individuals 
there is a lack of an ability to empathize (Linehan, 1993), or, from another perspective, a 
deficit in the reflective function (Fonagy & Target, 1996). 
Borderline patients continue to function in a “psychic equivalence” mode (i.e., 
internal reality is assumed to be identical with external reality) and therefore show an 
inability to play with reality, that is, internal experience is either denied or felt to be real; they 
are often highly concrete in their understandings of human relationships, and their 
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concreteness adds a certain desperation to their attempts, via splitting, dissociation, and 
projective identification, to rid themselves of persecutory alien aspects of the self (Fonagy, 
Gyorgy, Jurist, & Target, 2004). Therefore, the deficit in the reflective function fosters rapid 
oscillations between opposite representations, thus opening the way to those continuous 
cycles of idealization-devaluation typical of the borderline patients. 
This relational instability inevitably intensifies affective experiences, which 
sometimes appear unmanageable, out of control and impossible to be modulated. This 
extreme affective intensification is manifested through impulsive behaviors. For example, 
outbursts of anger or sudden manifestations of rage mainly directed towards the significant 
other represent an inability of the individual to modulate intense affective states associated 
with split-off, conflicting representations of others (Fonagy et al., 2004). Borderline patients 
thus seem to create traumatic relationships (Correale, 2007); that is, every relationship of 
BPD patients seems to reflect repetition compulsion or a self-fulfilling prophecy, as the usual 
outcome is a painful sense of being rejected or abandoned.  
 Usually, these relationships start as intense and passionate idealized love, which 
immediately traps the other so that there is no way out. After a while, however, the same 
relationships become the source of the severe fear of being abandoned and becoming lonely. 
Both these affective experiences (idealized love and fear of being abandoned) can be 
considered a consequence of the lack of object constancy, so that a unified and stable 
representation of the other cannot be evoked when the other is not physically present 
(Fonagy, 1991). 
 The lack of object constancy represents an inner emptiness. When events or situations 
even remotely suggest a possibility of separation or abandonment, borderline patients cannot 
evoke a comforting image of an object – the object has to be physically present for the fear of 
separation or abandonment to be alleviated.  This is why such events or situations are dreaded 
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and poorly tolerated. BPD patients are caught in a vicious cycle of a frantic search for love, 
recognition, attention and care, which they never receive to their satisfaction, thus fueling 
their search and alienating people whom they desperately pursue for their emotional survival.  
 Paradoxically, this pursuit occurs without borderline patients’ understanding of the 
person whom they pursue. Moreover, they harbor many doubts about that person’s 
trustworthiness and intentions, including the uncertainty about the person’s “true” feelings 
and the possibility of leaving or abandoning them. This uncertainty keeps patients in a state 
of perpetual restlessness and hypervigilance revolving around a detection of the earliest signs 
of rejection or abandonment. Therefore, BPD patients do not recognize the object as a 
subject, but experience him/her as a prosthesis or extension of their incomplete self 
(Stanghellini & Rossi Monti, 2009). If the other goes away, BPD patients lose their identity, 
which spills over as a liquid without a bowl.  
Identity diffusion permeates every area of borderline patients’ life, mainly manifesting 
itself in the inability to describe coherently one’s self and the others in terms of personal 
characteristics, tastes, social orientations, and affective and professional choices. This 
inability is experienced by borderline patients as a lack of sense, a sort of “narrative 
discontinuity” (McAdams, 1996) that gives an account of their typical experiences of 
boredom and emptiness. In fact, the borderline patients’ existence is always lacking 
something. It could be defined as an existence that has “the psychic background altered” and 
their subjective experience of themselves is a “patchy” experiential reality, made by just 
pieces of dismembered life (Correale, Alonzi, Carnevali, Di Giuseppe, & Giacchetti, 2001). 
As a consequence of this lack of inner integration, BPD patients collapse in a sense of 
alienation, as if their self is an “alien self” (Fonagy et al., 2004). Maybe this is why these 
patients are so “intolerant to aloneness” (Gunderson & Links, 2008) and why relationships or 
actions are the only solutions for survival. 
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1.3.3 Behavioral dysregulation 
The third predominant feature of BPD is behavioral dysregulation or dyscontrol. This 
refers to impulsivity or the borderline patients’ propensity to engage in impulsive behaviors. 
According to Fonagy and Luyten (2009), it is almost impossible to circumscribe the BPD 
impulsivity only to violent acts, because the characteristic of borderline psychopathology is 
shifting from one impulsive pattern to another. As DSM-5 (2013) points out, polysubstance 
abuse, disordered eating, excessive spending, unsafe sex and reckless driving by borderline 
patients should also be considered impulsive acts. Whatever form it takes, impulsivity is ego-
syntonic, because it gives relief to the anguish of emptiness and inner tension, thus making 
the borderline prisoner of a real behavioral script that is self-perpetuating (Zanarini & 
Frankenburg, 2007). 
  Behaviors that reflect core impulsivity (i.e., self-injury and suicide attempts) do not 
last long, but they have a profound impact both on patients and others and are often perceived 
as the most alarming feature of BPD. In contrast, affective (i.e., anger and emptiness) and 
relational (i.e., intolerance of aloneness and counter-dependency issues) aspects of 
dysregulation persist, seem to be the most stable over time (Zanarini et al., 2007), but are not 
as striking as acts of self-harm and suicide attempts. Epidemiological data show that 70%-
75% of borderline patients enact various self-harming behaviors (Clarkin, Widiger, Frances, 
Hurt, & Gilmore, 1983; Kerr, Muehlenkamp, & Turner, 2010; Zisook, Goff, Sledge, & 
Schuchter, 1994), while 5%-10% of them die by suicide (Black, Blum, Pfohl, & Hale, 2004).  
  Non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI; the act of deliberately procuring bodily injury without 
intent to die) is the most common reason BPD patients come to clinical attention (Gunderson 
& Links, 2008). The most frequent form of NSSI is cutting (80%), but bruising (24%), 
burning (20%), head banging (15%) and self-biting (7%) are also relatively common 
(Gunderson & Ridolfi, 2001). Most BPD patients (90%) report a history of self-harm; about 
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72% have a lifetime history of using multiple methods of self-harm (usually cutting, self-
punching, punching the walls, and head-banging); the frequency of self-harm decreases as 
patients get older, so that during the ninth and tenth years post index admission, less than 
18% of borderline patients report engaging in self-harm and less than 13% report two or more 
episodes (Zanarini et al., 2008).  
 Why do BPD patients need to enact these behaviors? Studies suggest that NSSI helps 
regulate affect (up to 96% of BPD patients who self-injure report relief from unpleasant 
emotions after self-injury) and that it is also associated with a decrease in dissociative 
symptoms (Crowell, Derbidge, & Beauchaine, 2014; Klonsky & Muehlenkamp, 2007; 
Shearer, 1994; Zanarini et al., 2008). Following this line of research and in an attempt to 
better understand the lived experience of these patients, we have proposed six “meaning-
organizers” for understanding self-injury in BPD (Rossi Monti & D’Agostino, 2009), as 
follows:  
1) To concretize. NSSI functions as a means to transform emotional pain into a physical 
one, to control intolerable feelings through the body. It might be an attempt to give 
shape to an invisible, wandering, and boundless mental pain by localizing it in the 
body, or to fill a distressing inner emptiness with a bodily sensation. At 
the moment of cutting, time stops and everything is concretely focused on physical 
pain (lower than the emotional pain) and bleeding. 
2) To punish-to eradicate-to purify. NSSI functions as a way to punish/eradicate a sort of 
inner ‘evil’ in order to detoxify/purify oneself. It is a way to punish a bad self, to 
assail one’s thoughts, feelings, and memories, or even to unconsciously repeat an 
emotional sequence connected to a history of childhood abuse: repetition here 
replaces bad memories. This way, cutting the skin creates an open window through 
 22 
which the inner tension can be released, and all the bad and alien parts can wriggle 
out from the interior of the body (Pestalozzi, 2003).  
3) To regulate dysphoria. NSSI functions as a tool to modulate the dysphoric mood 
typical of the borderline existence. It becomes a way to get at least temporary relief 
from distressing tension, to transform chaos into peace, and to control the mixture of 
negative emotions made by tension, irritability, discontent, and confusion, which is 
the chronic, painful background to the borderline experience. Besides, self-injury can 
also be helpful in interrupting the depersonalization/derealization cycle, searching for 
lively and stimulating experiences in physical pain to feel not empty or dead but 
rather alive.  
4) To communicate without words. NSSI functions as a language to convey something 
inexpressible through words, but also as a means to control others’ behavior and 
emotions by eliciting caregiving responses from them. However, this is not a form of 
manipulation. In fact, this latter term refers to a mode of thought and behavior 
requiring complex and sophisticated mental functions, which is gravely compromised 
in BPD (Stanghellini, 2014). Rather, in borderline psychopathology there is mostly an 
inability to freely treat the other as an autonomous and independent object and the 
necessity to treat him/her as a “subjective object” (Winnicott, 1969). 
5) Building a memory of oneself. NSSI functions as a tool to secure a memory of oneself. 
The skin is a surface on which to carve and mark circumstances, events, and emotions 
that correspond to significant turning points. A patient calls his self-inflicted wounds 
“my notches”. In this sense, self-cutting becomes a way to make sure that certain 
events have left a concrete and visible trace – a trace that can be immediately located 
on one’s skin.  
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6) Turning active: NSSI functions as a means to turning life experienced as passive, 
alien or imposed into a life experienced as active and with a sense of ownership.  This 
way, an intrinsically traumatic sense of helplessness is turned into a more reassuringly 
self-inflicted trauma. Besides, self-cutting can be also an attempt to shed skin instead 
of changing oneself. It can take on the characteristics of a ritual through which one’s 
need to feel in control of one’s body is acted out (Lemma, 2005). In this sense, the 
wounds become brands to exhibit as truly distinguishing features. 
Thus, in general, self-injury causes a temporary relief from negative emotional states 
and experiences (i.e., anxiety, depersonalization or desperation), but it also contributes to the 
salvation, healing and protection of one’s own structure (Favazza, 1996). Far from being a 
deconstructive passage to the act, it can be seen as a self-constructive “act of passage”, a 
paradoxical remedy to cope with an unbearable distress, a mean for crossing and conjure the 
flood of suffering (Le Breton, 2003, 2007).  
1.4  Back to basics: a multifactorial etiology 
1.4.1 Genetic and temperamental factors 
In 1997, Zanarini and Frankenburg hypothesized a multifactorial etiology of BPD, 
comprising three elements:  genetic and temperamental vulnerability, traumatic childhood, 
and a triggering event or a series of events, such as sexual abuse or other traumatic 
experiences. In this section, we will focus on genetic and temperamental factors. Gunderson 
(2011) reported that BPD was significantly heritable, with 42% to 68% of the variance 
associated with genetic factors. However, other researchers showed that heritability is 
restricted only to some components of BPD, such as impulsivity (Distel et al., 2010). 
 Similarly, some studies propose that temperament is the only factor that is inherited, 
considered as predictive of the development of borderline symptoms, and that, combined 
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with specific environmental factors, it can facilitate the expression of psychopathology 
(Stepp, Keenan, Hipwell, & Krueger, 2014). According to Zanarini and Frankenburg (1997, 
2007), BPD may be characterized by a vulnerable or “hyperbolic” temperament. This concept 
is similar to that of negative affectivity. However, hyperbolic temperament is different from 
negative affectivity in two ways: first, hyperbolic temperament refers to a tendency to 
experience inner pain (i.e., profound negative affects) in response to perceived interpersonal 
disappointment or frustration, while negative affectivity implies a heightened tendency to 
experience negative emotions in general, whether or not they are triggered by certain events; 
secondly, hyperbolic temperament is associated with perceived maltreatment during 
development, while negative affectivity is an endogenous, heritable disposition that is stable 
across situations (Yalch, Hopwood, & Zanarini, 2015). 
From a neurobiological perspective, some studies highlight that BPD, and especially 
the behavioral impulsivity, is associated with indices of diminished central serotonergic 
function, independent of suicidal behavior, depression or alcohol use disorder (Soloff, Kelly, 
Strotmeyer, Malone, & Mann, 2003). Other research in BPD patients has demonstrated an 
enhanced activation of the left amygdala and right insula during the initial viewing of 
aversive stimuli, along with an attenuated activation of the left orbitofrontal cortex and 
increased activation of the bilateral insula during attempts to decrease the initial emotional 
reaction (Schulze, Domes, & Kruger, 2011). It has also been reported that BPD is 
characterized by modest volume reductions of the hippocampus and the amygdala bilaterally, 
which cannot be due to comorbid psychopathology (Ruocco, Amirthavasagam, & Zakzanis, 
2012). 
Other cerebral structures that have been implicated in BPD include dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex grey matter volume (inversely associated with impulsivity; Sala, Caverzasi, 
& Lazzaretti, 2011) and fronto-limbic circuit (related to affective instability and interpersonal 
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disturbances; Minzenberg, Fan, & New, 2008). With regards to interpersonal functioning, it 
has been associated with alterations in the social reward and empathy network, with 
increasing evidence of the role played by the oxytocinergic system (Herpertz & Bertsch, 
2015). Finally, a study conducted through Bayesian network model reveals that most of the 
biological findings in BPD described above are statistically interconnected and 
interdependent, thus indicating the biological consistency of this diagnosis (De la Fuente, 
Bengoetxea, & Navarro, 2011). 
1.4.2 Cognitive and neurocognitive factors 
Before going forward, we want to dedicate a paragraph to cognitive and 
neurocognitive factors, which are equally important in the development of BPD, linking 
genetic and temperamental factors with the environmental and situational ones. According to 
a recent review by Mac and Lam (2013) summarizing neurocognitive research, BPD is 
associated with: a) executive dysfunction; b) “cold” (i.e., non-emotionally valenced) 
cognition distortions; c) social cognition deficits. We will now describe each of these features 
in detail.  
With regards to executive dysfunction, BPD seems to be related to problems with 
executive control, working memory and long-term memory consolidation, which are in turn 
linked to affective dysregulation and impulsivity (Ruocco, 2005). Suicidal behavior seems to 
be related to cognitive rigidity and aberrant decision-making processes (LeGris & van 
Reekum, 2006). Studies show that response inhibition deficits are present in first-degree 
relatives of BPD patients and may be heritable between siblings, thus suggesting that these 
aspects of executive dysfunction might serve as an endophenotype for BPD (Ruocco, 
Laporte, Russell, Guttman, & Paris, 2012). 
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In terms of  “cold” cognition distortions, BPD patients tend to make risky choices and 
are unable to improve their performance, thus not learning from negative feedback; these 
features are associated with BPD symptom severity and impulsivity (Schuermann, 
Kathmann, Stiglmayr, Renneberg, & Endrass, 2011). Moreover, dichotomous thinking seems 
to be a characteristic of BPD, along with other cognitive biases similar to a schizophrenic 
thinking style, such as attribution to only one cause, jumping to conclusion and paranoid 
cognitive style (i.e., mistrust); these features are associated with BPD symptoms severity 
(Moritz et al., 2011). 
With regards to social cognition, BPD patients seem to exhibit an impairment in both 
cognitive and emotional components of empathy, which could contribute to interpersonal 
problems (Dziobek et al., 2011). We will describe this aspect of BPD in more detail in the 
next chapter.  It should be mentioned, however, that BPD patients seem to have difficulties 
with “mentalization”, that is, the process by which we make sense of each other and 
ourselves, implicitly and explicitly, in terms of subjective states and mental processes  
(Fonagy, 1989; Bateman & Fonagy, 2004). However, opinions are conflicting in this regard: 
while some authors report reduced mentalization (i.e., a tendency to under-attribute others’ 
intentions) (Bateman & Fonagy, 2010), others report enhanced mentalization (i.e., a tendency 
to over-attribute others’ intentions) (Sharp & Vanwoerden, 2015).  
Regardless of these apparently different views, enhanced mentalization often has the 
same outcome as reduced mentalization, with both resulting in a distorted perception of other 
people’s mental states (Chiesa & Fonagy, 2014). In addition, BPD patients also show a 
poorer social perspective coordination, being more likely to feel socially excluded even when 
that is not the case and to experience negative emotions towards others (Jennings, Hulbert, 
Jackson, & Chanen, 2012; Staebler et al., 2011). Finally, BPD patients seem to have an 
attentional bias for fearful faces and difficulty shifting attention away from threatening 
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stimuli (Mak & Lam, 2013), and they also tend to show fewer positive facial expressions and 
more mixed emotional expressions in response to social exclusion (Staebler et al., 2011). 
1.4.3 Environmental and situational factors 
Another etiological factor that may contribute to the development of BPD is the 
childhood sexual abuse, reported in a large proportion (about 60%) of BPD patients 
(Gabbard, Beck, & Holmes, 2005; Sharp & Tackett, 2014; Widow, Czaja, & Paris, 2009; 
Zanarini, 1997). Several studies, in fact, show a relationship between sexual abuse in 
childhood and BPD (Bornovalova et al., 2013) in terms of development of internalizing 
symptoms, such as anxiety and depression (Eaton et al., 2011), affective dysregulation, and 
substance abuse (Scott, Stepp, & Pilkonis, 2014).  A number of studies suggest the role of 
other traumatic events as potential etiological factors in BPD, such as emotive abuse (Carr & 
Francis, 2009), and early neglect (Carlson, Egeland, & Sroufe, 2009).  
Between 30% and 90% of patients with BPD report early traumatic experiences in 
childhood, compared to 17%-45% of the control group (Ball & Links, 2009; Bornovalova, 
Gratz, Delany-Brumsey, Paulson, & Lejuez, 2006). In particular, research shows a consistent 
relationship between childhood trauma and symptom severity of BPD in adulthood (Briere, 
Kaltman, & Green, 2008). Of all traumatic events in childhood, sexual abuse was reported to 
be the most significant predictor of BPD (Infurna et al., 2016; Sansone, Songer, & Miller, 
2005). Zanarini et al. (1997) propose to consider it more broadly as marker of the severity of 
family environment dysfunction, as well as a traumatic event or a series of events in itself (p. 
1105). 
Regarding family environment dysfunction, several studies focused their attention on 
the relationship between (insecure) attachment style and development of borderline 
personality disorder, underlying that the latter is strongly influenced by a disorganized state 
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of mind and inherently associated to the relational atmosphere in which the patient lives 
(Gunderson & Links, 2008; Lyons-Ruth & Melnick, 2004). According to some authors 
(Farina & Liotti, 2011; Liotti, 2004), the relational situation that leads to the disorganization 
of attachment can be characterized by a so traumatic nature that it can even have a 
predominant role on dissociation. Trauma, dissociation, and the disorganization of attachment 
can also impact on the reflective function, thus making it weaker. 
 Taken together, these studies strongly suggest that borderline psychopathology is 
related to several types of abuse in childhood, along with disturbances in the family 
environment of BPD patients (Zanarini et al., 2004). Moreover, the experience of early 
trauma and pathological family environment seems to account for several features of BPD, 
such as dissociative manifestations and affect dysregulation, as well as difficulty in 
mentalization, problems in communicating emotions, behavioral dyscontrol, and, finally, 
inability to tolerate stress (Linehan, 1993). 
However, it is important to specify in this context that borderline personality disorder 
is more than a simple sum of all these etiological factors (Paris, 2007). For example, a recent 
study by Miskewicz et al. (2015) has demonstrated that the nine DSM-5 criteria for BPD are 
related to specific situational triggers. These triggers included rejection, abandonment, 
disappointment (in others), isolation, interpersonal offenses, betrayals, boring situations and 
identity threats (i.e., events or others’ behaviors that threaten vulnerable self-image of BPD 
patients). Although all these triggers uniquely predicted BPD symptoms, interpersonal 
offenses, disappointment (in others) and identity threats were the strongest predictions 
(Miskewicz et al., 2015).  
This evidence is relevant especially from a clinical point of view. It means that, 
although the psychological process of reacting to triggers with symptoms is a process 
common to those all along the BPD severity spectrum, different individuals respond to the 
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triggers in different ways. In fact, each borderline patient has a unique pathway to the 
development of BPD, that can be seen as “a painful variation on an unfortunate but familiar 
theme” (Zanarini & Frankenburg, 1997). In this sense, the borderline psychopathology can be 
visualized as a “condominium”. Using Kernberg’ theory of personality organization, mental 
functioning of the condominium tenants on upper floors (i.e., patients with low BPD severity) 
has neurotic characteristics, while mental functioning of the tenants on lower floors (i.e., 
patients with high BPD severity) is akin to psychotic functioning (Rossi Monti & 
D’Agostino, 2009). Understanding these individual differences within BPD can help to 
develop tailored and effective treatments.  
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Chapter 2 
A new model for understanding BPD 
 
 
2.1  What it is like to be borderline: the model at a glance  
 As shown in the previous chapter, borderline personality disorder is a very complex 
disorder that has multiple etiological factors and manifests itself in many ways, thus 
undermining the modern diagnostic system and leading clinicians to grapple with it. In this 
sense, psychopathology can be helpful. How? Its contribution goes beyond the description of 
the symptoms or the structural functioning of the disorder (i.e., Kernberg’s borderline 
personality organization), emphasizing instead the singular experience of the borderline 
patient in terms of subjective consciousness (Rossi Monti & D’Agostino, 2014). And therein 
lies the crux of the matter. 
 As Nagel (1974) states, “consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really 
intractable […] It occurs at many levels of animal life, though we cannot be sure of its 
presence in the simpler organisms, and it is very difficult to say in general what provides 
evidence of it […] But fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if 
there is something that it is like to be that organism – something it is like for the organism. 
We may call this the subjective character of the experience” (pp. 435-436). So, as Nagel 
argues that the right way to explore mental phenomena should not be to ask what it would 
feel like for us to be a bat, but, rather, what it feels like for a bat to be a bat, we could also 
ask what it feels like for a borderline to be a borderline to understand better his/her 
functioning from within.  
 These are the roots for the idea of the development of a new psychopathological 
dynamic model for understanding borderline personality disorder. Following the line of 
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research opened almost thirty years ago by the so-called Vienna school (Berner, Musalek, & 
Walter, 1987; Gabriel, 1987), the model focuses on dysphoria that is the core of the BPD 
affective instability. Dysphoria is a term that is becoming increasingly popular in clinical 
parlance, but its meaning is still surrounded by a halo of vagueness (Starcevic, 2007; 
Starcevic, Rossi Monti, D’Agostino, & Berle, 2013. In psychiatric and clinical psychology 
literature, it appears in the context of mood, anxiety and personality disorders and is used to 
describe a mixture of negative and unpleasant emotions without any specific features (Cella, 
Cooper, Dymond, & Reed, 2008; Starcevic et al., 2013; Voruganti & Awad, 2004).  
However, according to Pazzagli and Rossi Monti (2000), dysphoria characterizes the 
psychopathological condition of borderline patients. In this sense, dysphoria can be seen as a 
framework conferring a unitary meaningfulness to heterogeneous manifestations of BPD 
pathological phenomena, thus functioning as a real “psychopathological organizer” (Rossi 
Monti & Stanghellini, 1996). In other words, we argue that dysphoria is a process structuring 
the BPD experience in multiple, psychopathological pathways moving from basic lived 
experience (dispositional level) to symptomatic disturbances (and vice versa), through here-
and-now lived experience (situational level), thus forming a real dysphoric cycle (Figure 
2.1). 
More specifically, a first pathway can be traced back to background dysphoria, a 
chronic, persistent trait dominating the basic lived experience of BPD, together with negative 
interpersonal disposition, constituted in turn by three sub-dimensions: a) hostile distrust, b) 
interpersonal sensitivity, and c) impaired empathy (See Figure 2.3). In particular context-
dependent circumstances, background dysphoria and negative interpersonal disposition 
jointly affect a second pathway that ends up in a specific condition: situational dysphoria, 
an acute, intermittent state pervading the here-and-now lived experience of BPD. Taken 
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together, background dysphoria, negative interpersonal disposition, and situational dysphoria 
constitute, so to speak, the BPD “interpersonal-affective specialty”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The variety of symptomatic disturbances can be seen as the surface of this 
interpersonal-affective specialty or the final outcome of the whole dysphoric cycle. In fact, 
situational dysphoria plays a key role in BPD. Loaded with background dysphoria and 
negative interpersonal disposition, and solicited by contingent stressful events, it needs an 
escape route. This is found by following two pathways: one disorganizing and another 
organizing, each ending up in several acute, recurrent phenomena (i.e., the nine DSM-5 
symptoms). See Figure 2.2 for an overview of the model in its main components and Figure 
2.3 for a more detailed picture of the model. 
Figure 2.1. The dysphoric cycle in borderline personalty disorder 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Schematic drawing of the multiple pathways of dysphoria in BPD, moving from basic lived 
experience level to symptomatic disturbances level (and vice versa), through here-and-now lived 
experience level, to form “dysphoric cycle”. 
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Figure 2.2. The new psychopathological-dynamic model for understanding BPD in its 
main components 
 
 
 
 
    
Basic lived experience 
Chronic persistent traits 
Here-and-now lived experience 
Acute intermittent state 
Symptomatic disturbances 
Acute recurrent phenomena 
Figure 2.2. Schematic drawing of the new psychopathological-dynamic model for understanding BPD in its main 
components. At the basic lived experience level: background dysphoria and negative interpersonal disposition; at the 
here-and-now lived experience level: situational dysphoria; at the symptomatic disturbances level: organizing and 
disorganizing pathways of symptoms. 
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 Before describing each pathway in greater detail, it would be helpful to summarize the 
whole dysphoric cycle in BPD with a metaphor. We can assume that the BPD patient is like a 
person whose family has a company manufacturing guns (traumatic etiology that we do not 
take into direct account in the model but that we hypothesize as being at its roots). We thus 
assume that he/she has a gun available at home (background dysphoria) together with the 
bullets for that gun (negative interpersonal disposition). In a specific moment of his/her life 
something happens in the environment that makes him/her feel he/she is not in control, thus 
becoming convinced that it is time to use the gun and load the trigger (situational dysphoria). 
Then he/she shoots (symptoms). Some gunshots hit some targets (organizing pathway of 
symptoms), while others do not have the strength to go beyond him/herself and arrive at 
his/her foot at maximum, making him/her lose balance (disorganizing pathway of symptoms). 
In both cases the person has lowered the internal pressure, thus coming back to the baseline 
state, that of having a gun and bullets available for the next shoot. 
2.2 Basic lived experience level 
2.2.1 Background dysphoria 
At the basic lived experience level, two main features characterize the borderline 
patient: background dysphoria and negative interpersonal disposition. As mentioned above, 
dysphoria is a complex construct that is both unclear and popular at the same time. Although 
initially used to characterize a personality-based mood disorder (“hysteroid dysphoria”) 
described by Leibowitz and Klein (1979), it has been used in the English-language 
psychiatric literature as a synonym for mild depression and for evaluating aggressive and 
suicidal behaviors in depressed patients. But in the German-language phenomenological 
psychiatric literature, dysphoria has a more specific meaning and is conceptualized as a “third 
emotional field” (in addition to mania and depression); it is defined as an unpleasant state, 
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characterized by tension, irritability, hostility, and proneness to aggressive acting-out 
(Berner, Musalek, & Walter, 1987). 
Our definition of background dysphoria is rooted in this latter perspective. It is an 
unpleasant, uncomfortable, negative, and oppressive condition characterized by four 
predominant sub-dimensions: irritability, discontent, interpersonal resentment, and surrender 
(Starcevic, 2007). Further, it contains all the features of mood: it is enduring, devoid of an 
intentional object, unmotivated, rigid, difficult to articulate, encompassing the whole horizon 
of the subject and affecting his relationship with the world, others, and himself (Rossi Monti, 
2012; Rossi Monti & D’Agostino, 2014). In other words, “it is the long-lasting and profound 
emotional tonality … in which the borderline person is enmeshed” (Stanghellini & Rosfort, 
2013a, p. 266). In this sense, it represents the persistent, tormenting experience of BPD. 
A patient describes this daily condition this way: “It’s like getting up in the morning 
and banging your toe against the bed!” (Rossi Monti & D’Agostino, 2014, p. 455). This is 
similar to what happens when someone twists a nail upon hammering it into the wall. From 
then on, everything falls apart. It is impossible to straighten the nail and any attempt to fix the 
situation only leads to more trouble. The twisted nail becomes an obstacle to completing the 
entire plan of hanging a picture on the wall that consequently has too many (small) holes. Yet 
the experience of dysphoria as a general mood is also more complex than this.  
Continuing with the metaphor used by the patient, background dysphoria can be seen 
as not being just a problem of a banged toe or a twisted nail (i.e., a problem where a 
triggering event focuses all the attention on itself); rather “it is as if the toe, once and for all, 
had banged against the bed in some kind of primeval and forgotten condition, but the 
emotional experience related to this event had settled deep in the subject and conditioned its 
emotional barometer irreversibly” (Ibid.). In dysphoria the name of the object is lost and only 
the background emotion remains. Detached from its possible “object hooks”, this emotion 
 36 
fills the air like a gas, contaminating the entire emotional life of the patient and overflowing 
into its relationship with the others.  
Zanarini and Frankenburg (2007) describe a condition similar to background 
dysphoria when talking about “intense and chronic inner pain” as the essential nature of 
borderline patients. This pain is different from the pain of others due to its multifaceted 
nature and its overall amplitude (Zanarini et al., 1998). Firstly, such authors hypothesized that 
this intense inner pain characteristic of BPD patients resulted from severe traumatic events 
(i.e., childhood abuse and neglect) (Zanarini & Frankenburg, 1997). Secondly, they stated 
that it comes from a temperamental vulnerability of borderline patients that makes them 
sensitive to much more subtle interpersonal experiences. “Statements such as ‘I am in the 
worst pain since the history of the world began’ are not uncommon and suggest how isolated 
and alienated many borderline patients feel” (Zanarini, 2008, p. 507). 
2.2.2 Negative interpersonal disposition 
   Background dysphoria does not exist in a vacuum. Rather, it is relational in nature, 
just as the original “hysteroid dysphoria” was an affective state strongly dependent on 
relational variables (Leibowitz & Kelin, 1979). This means that the pathway of background 
dysphoria intersects with another factor characterizing BPD functioning: negative 
interpersonal disposition. This is a sort of vulnerability to interpersonal dysfunction that we 
hypothesize is constituted by three sub-dimensions, which are among the core features of 
BPD interpersonal dysfunction (Lazarus, Cheavens, Festa, & Rosenthal, 2014): hostile 
distrust, interpersonal sensitivity, and impaired empathy. Since these sub-dimensions are 
recognized in the literature as separate constructs that correspond to different characteristics 
of BPD, a separate section will be dedicated to each of them. 
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 Hostile distrust 
Hostile distrust can be defined as the cognitive component of hostility consisting of 
negative beliefs of others perceived to be threating antagonists (Barefoot, 1992). 
Dysfunctional beliefs represent a relevant part of the phenomenology of BPD (Bhar, Brown 
and Beck, 2008). “These beliefs are said to influence how such individuals typically view 
themselves, others and the world, and thus have an effect on the patient’s interpersonal 
functioning, negative affect, self-harm, and suicidal behaviors” (Bhar et al., 2008, p. 166). In 
this sense, hostile distrust is just one of a wide number of beliefs that are characteristic of the 
borderline mind and that could be summarized in these three basic schemata: “The world is 
(and others) dangerous and malevolent”, “I am powerless and vulnerable”, and “I am 
inherently bad and unacceptable” (Arntz, Dietzel, & Dreesen, 1999; Barnow et al., 2009; 
Bhar et al., 2008). 
According to Beck, Freeman, Davis and Associates (2004), this combination of 
dysfunctional beliefs in BPD contributes to high levels of vigilance and instability in mood 
and interpersonal functioning. In particular, the authors hypothesize that patients feeling 
helpless without the constant support of others but also being distrustful of others are prone to 
alternating between clinging to other people because of fears of abandonment/intolerance of 
aloneness and pushing them away because of distrust, thus being in a “no win” situation 
where neither the desire for safety nor support is fulfilled. However, among all the 
dysfunctional beliefs, interpersonal distrust seems to be the only one significantly associated 
with both hopelessness and suicide ideation (Bhar et al., 2008), thus confirming previous 
studies showing an association between paranoid ideation, depressive symptoms, and suicide 
attempts (Candido & Romney, 2002; Evren & Evren, 2004; Ozkan & Antindag, 2005).  
Moreover, in a study comparing depressed non-borderline patients with depressed 
borderline patients, it has been found that, although both groups tend to distort their 
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interpersonal perceptions, only depressed borderline patients tend to behave in a more hostile 
manner due to their distrustful thoughts and to view themselves as more hostile and labile 
than depressed non-borderline patients (Stern, Herron, Primavera, & Kakuma, 1997). Further, 
depressed borderline patients rate their behaviors and that of both parents more negatively 
than do depressed non-borderline ones but when assessing current relationships with relatives 
at their worst, they rate themselves, but not their relatives, as significantly more hostile than 
do depressed non-borderline patients. This finding is consistent with psychodynamic theory’s 
premise that borderline individuals internalize hostile familial relationships and that this, in 
turn, results in increased self-attack (Benjamin & Wonderlich, 1994) or in a perception of the 
self as more attacking and rejecting towards others (Stern et al., 1997). 
According to Fonagy and Allison (2014), the dysfunctional belief of hostile distrust, 
typical of BPD, has its roots in early negative experiences. As the authors say, developmental 
adversity, particularly attachment trauma, may trigger a profound destruction of trust, thus 
generating “epistemic hypervigilance” or “epistemic mistrust”, defined as a lack of trust in 
both attachment figures and strangers as source of information. “Once epistemic trust has 
been lost, its absence creates an apparent rigidity […] In terms of the theory of natural 
pedagogy, the person has a (temporarily) reduced capacity to learn from ‘teachers’. From a 
therapist’s standpoint, he or she has become ‘hard to reach’ and potentially interpersonally 
inaccessible” (p. 375). 
 Interpersonal sensitivity 
 Interpersonal sensitivity is the second sub-dimension constituting negative 
interpersonal disposition. It can be defined as relational reactivity, or hypersensitivity to an 
interpersonal stressor, combining abandonment fears, rejection sensitivity, and intolerance of 
aloneness (Gunderson & Lyons-Ruth, 2008). As evidenced by research, BPD patients have 
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stronger emotional reactions in the context of social interactions compared to others (Lazarus 
et al., 2014). In particular, Tragesser, Lippman, Trull, and Barrett (2008) found that 
undergraduates with high BPD features reported that they would be more likely to feel both 
angry and sad in reaction to imagined teasing than those with low BPD features, regardless of 
the source (i.e., friend or stranger) or the content (i.e., sensitive or non-sensitive topic).  
 However, Chapman, Walters, and Dixon-Gordon (2014), in a laboratory paradigm 
involving negative social and academic feedback, found that the content of the social 
feedback did influence emotional reactions of individuals with high BPD features. These 
participants showed a significant increase in negative emotions within a social feedback 
condition but not within an academic feedback condition while the controls showed the 
opposite pattern (i.e., significant increase in negative emotions to the academic stressor but 
not to the social stressor). Similarly, Staebler et al. (2011) and Renneberg et al. (2012), using 
a virtual ball toss to game (“Cyberball” by Williams & Jervis, 2006) to simulate social 
inclusion or exclusion, found that BPD patients felt more readily excluded and reported 
greater self-focused negative emotions (i.e., sadness, loneliness) than controls both before 
and after playing Cyberball, but an increase in other-focused negative emotions (i.e., 
resentment, anger) compared to controls that did not after exclusion. 
 Further, some studies highlight several neurobiological correlates of stronger 
emotional responses to interpersonal stimuli. For example, Walter et al. (2008) found that 
BPD participants had a delayed recovery of cortisol response following a conflict discussion 
compared to controls. Similarly, Simeon, Knutelska, Smith, Baker, and Hollander (2007) 
found that the BPD high dissociation group had a more robust peak response to a public 
speaking social stressor than BPD low dissociation and control groups. In addition, Ruocco et 
al. (2010), using a task that simulates social inclusion and exclusion via a card game played 
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with confederates, found that BPD participants showed greater activation in the left medial 
prefrontal cortex (mPF) than controls when excluded from the card games. 
 Taken together, these studies seem to confirm the presence of a psychobiological 
disposition for interpersonal reactivity in individuals with BPD. Following this perspective, 
Gunderson and Lyons-Ruth (2008) hypothesized a complex gene-environment-
developmental model to explain BPD characterized by an “interpersonal hypersensitivity 
phenotype” which seems to demonstrate a heritability of 0.48 (Jang, Livesley, Vernon, & 
Jackson, 1996). According to the authors, a genetic predisposition to interpersonal 
hypersensitivity combined with other negative relational experiences during a child’s early 
development stages, solicits controlling-caregiving or controlling-punitive interpersonal 
strategies, which in turn represent the breeding ground for the development of borderline 
psychopathology. In this sense, BPD develops within an interpersonal context and emerges 
within an affective environment. 
 Impaired empathy 
Impaired empathy is the third sub-dimension constituting negative interpersonal 
disposition in BPD. It can be defined as impairment in empathic capacity or the lack of 
ability to comprehend another person’s state of mind (Davis, 1983). Empathy includes both 
an emotional and cognitive component (Davis, 1983; Duan & Hill, 1997; Feschbach, 1987). 
While the emotional one is related to experiencing another person’s feelings, the cognitive 
one is associated with the ability to recognize another’s feelings without vicariously 
experiencing them (Batson, 1987; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972). Despite all these studies, 
however, empathy (and its impairment) remains a difficult concept to define (Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright, 2004). Researchers in this area have traditionally defined empathy in one of 
two ways: affective or cognitive. 
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The affective approach defines empathy in terms of an observer’s emotional response 
to the affective state of another. The definition of empathy varies depending on how broad or 
narrow the empathic response is. According to Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2004), four 
types of empathy can be described: 1) The observer’s feeling must match that of the person 
observed (i.e., you see someone else’s fear and you feel fright) (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987); 
2) The observer’s feeling is appropriate to that of the person observed even though it does not 
need to be exactly the same (i.e., you see someone else’s sadness and you feel pity) (Stotland, 
1969); 3) The observer’s feeling is any emotional response to the feeling of the observed 
person (i.e., you see another’s pain and you feel pleasure) (this is called “contrast empathy” 
by Stotland, Sherman, & Shaver, 1971); 4) The observer’s feeling is of concern or 
compassion to the distress of the observed person (Batson, 1991). 
On the other hand, the cognitive approach defines empathy in terms of understanding 
the other’s feelings (Kohler, 1929). In the past researchers focused primarily on the cognitive 
processes of empathy such as role-taking, switching attention to take another’s perspective 
(Mead, 1934), “decentering” (i.e., responding non-egocentrically, Piaget, 1932), and later, 
“social acuity” (Chapin, 1942; Dymond, 1950; Kerr & Speroff, 1954). More recently, 
researchers have begun to emphasize a “theory of mind” (Astington, Harris, & Olson, 1988) 
or “mindreading” (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Whiten, 1991). This involves cognitive processes, 
such as comprehension and inferential process (i.e., attributing mental states to the other 
person and inferring the content of his/her mental state) and also the ability to predict 
another’s behavior or mental state (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). 
There is some evidence that indicates that empathy is impaired in psychopathological 
populations such as those with BPD. Some studies report impairment in both cognitive and 
emotional empathy in BPD (Dziobek et al., 2011) or in cognitive but not emotional empathy 
(Harari, Shamay-Tsoory, Ravid, & Levkowitz, 2009). On the other hand, there are studies 
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that contradict impaired empathy and instead demonstrate increased performance in 
emotional empathy, thus suggesting that borderlines are especially empathic (“borderline 
empathy”), and can easily resonate or enter relationship with strangers (Frank & Hoffman, 
1986; Gunderson, Zanarini, Kolb, & Austin, 1981; Ladisich & Feil, 1988).  
Nevertheless, it should be taken into account that BPD patients are not able to sustain 
harmonious long-term relationships (Guttman & Laporte, 2000) and that the cognitive and 
emotional components of empathy cannot be easily separated (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 
2004). So, although the contradictory findings may be related to the different methodologies 
used in the studies (Lazarus et al., 2014), the imbalance between the emotional and cognitive 
components of empathy in BPD can be explained in terms of deficits in higher-order 
cognitive processes. These higher-order cognitive processes fail to modulate the lower-level 
automatic emotional contagion (Harari et al., 2010), thus elevating emotional empathy and 
highlighting an impairment in the empathic capacities anyway. Therefore, as Guttman and 
Laporte (2000) suggest, “it is probably more accurate to use the term ‘borderline sensitivity’ 
rather than ‘borderline empathy’ to describe their way of relating, so as not to confuse it with 
a multidimensional capacity that includes both the cognitive and emotional components of 
empathy” (p. 354). 
2.3  Here-and-now lived experience level 
2.3.1 Situational dysphoria 
 In specific circumstances, background dysphoria and negative interpersonal 
disposition, both dominating the basic lived experience of the borderline patient, can lead into 
another form of dysphoria saturating a BPD person’s here-and-now lived experience: 
situational dysphoria. This is a contingent state that consists of three sub-dimensions: 
pressure, urge (to act), and quasi-explosion, which is very dependent on situational triggers 
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(personal, interpersonal, and environmental). It is a kind of impatience and intolerance that 
leads to a drive to violent action (not necessarily in the sense of physical violence, but rather 
a great intensity of the emotions involved). It is like feeling “on the edge”, together with a 
tendency to anxiety, apprehension, and intensification of reactivity and vigilance in a state of 
dysphoric alertness. It represents the cyclic and temporary experience of BPD. 
 From this perspective, the events triggering situational dysphoria can be seen as 
proximal mechanisms that, unlike distal mechanisms (i.e., genetic, cognitive, and 
environmental risk factors), largely drive the acute, short-term occurrence of BPD symptoms 
(Miskewicz et al., 2015). “Rather than increasing risk for the development of BPD symptoms 
in a lifetime, proximal mechanisms increase risk for the occurrence of BPD symptoms at a 
given moment. Proximal mechanisms may also have symptom-specific effects, such that 
different symptoms occur in response to different triggers” (p. 487). Focusing on proximal 
mechanisms thus allows for the variability in symptom expressions of BPD in daily life. 
Moreover, the presence of events triggering situational dysphoria makes the 
borderline psychopathology an almost entirely “personal matter”. In fact, as demonstrated 
by Wright, Hopwood, and Simms (2015) in their study testing individuals with personality 
disorders (40% BPD), 40-50% of the variance in interpersonal behavior and affect of PDs 
was due to daily fluctuations that were modestly related to dispositional problems but 
strongly related to daily stress. Following this line of research, some authors define 
borderline proximal mechanisms as “trigger-symptom contingencies” (Furr, Fleeson, 
Anderson, & Arnold, in preparation), suggesting that “a person’s individual variability in 
daily BPD symptom occurrences […] can be accounted for by the particular triggers 
encountered in everyday life” (Miskewicz et al., 2015, p. 487). But what kind of situational 
triggers are we talking about?  
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According to recent but limited literature, interpersonal events seem to be the most 
relevant triggers underlying momentary BPD symptoms (Brodsky, Groves, Oquendo, Mann, 
& Stanley, 2006; Goodman et al., 2009; Rossi Monti & D’Agostino, 2014). Particularly, 
rejection and abandonment are the most cited events associated with interpersonal symptoms 
in BPD (Berenson, Downey, Rafaeli, Coifman, & Paquin, 2011; Coifman, Berenson, Rafaeli, 
& Downey, 2012; Sadikaj, Moskowitz, Russell, Zuroff, & Paris, 2013; Zeigler-Hill & 
Abraham, 2006). However, due to the very fine interpersonal sensitivity of the borderline 
patients, we hypothesize that minor interpersonal events (i.e., micro-conflicts in romantic 
relationships) are enough to make ancient rejecting and abandoning ghosts present again and 
turn situational dysphoria on, thus paving the way to symptomatic phenomena. 
 Alongside interpersonal events, there are other situations that literature reveals as 
being also involved in triggering BPD symptoms, even if to a reduced extent. Environmental 
and personal or cognitive events such as boring situations and identity threats are have been 
documented to be associated with BPD impulsivity, identity symptoms, and sense of 
emptiness (Linehan, 1993; Bender & Skodol, 2007). We think that minor environmental (i.e., 
to have had a minor accident) and personal or cognitive events (i.e., to have worried for a 
intervened problem) are enough to activate situational dysphoria and lead to symptom 
expression. But they are never as strong as interpersonal triggers. 
2.4 Symptomatic disturbances level 
2.4.1 Organizing way 
The organizing pathway of situational dysphoria ends up in a behavior possessing a 
specific content or an emotional condition with a dominant affect: fear or anger. This 
affect/behavior can take different forms (sub-dimensions in the model): fears of 
abandonment, outbursts of anger, stormy relationships, non-suicidal self-injury and suicidal 
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behaviors, and other risky behaviors (i.e., polysubstances abuse, eating disorders, excessive 
spending, unsafe sex, and reckless driving). Here we will mainly focus on anger and non-
suicidal self-injury as we consider them the most representative BPD psychopathological 
phenomena from the organizing point of view. 
In its Latin and Greek roots (angor, ancho), anger refers to strangling, meaning an 
emotion normally conceived as involving a personal offense or somehow having been 
wronged by another person (Stanghellini & Rosfort, 2013b). In this sense, anger has several 
functions: a) to cancel a source of irritation or pain; b) to remove an obstacle to gratification; 
c) to restore a sense of autonomy in the face of very frustrating situations (Kernberg, 1992; 
1994). In the first two cases, anger identifies an object as ‘source’ of pain or ‘obstacle’ to 
gratification. In the third case, instead, anger has an effect on the self.  
In light of this premise and in order to better describe the role of anger in BPD, it is 
important to introduce a phenomenological distinction between affect and mood. While affect 
typically involves an explicit intentional object that directs and informs the affect itself, mood 
is normally not directed or informed by any particular object but refers to an ambiguous and 
highly frustrating emotional vacuum (Rosfort & Stanghellini, 2009). Anger and dysphoria 
can be inserted into this dialectic. If anger can be considered as affect, dysphoria can be 
described as a mood. What does this mean? We will explain it now, focusing on the four 
main areas of object, hope, self, and authenticity (Rossi Monti & D’Agostino, 2014). 
First of all, anger is the means through which the borderline patient reacts to every 
minimal breaking in empathy: anger emerges when the patient feels that the other will not 
assume the function he desperately needs. In fact, anger makes the object clearly visible, 
strongly characterized and standing out very distinctively. It allows the BPD patient to switch 
from the state of vagueness typical of dysphoric mood (where the object is blurred, nebulous, 
and ambiguous) to a condition in which the object is crisp and clear. In this sense, anger has a 
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“centripetal” role, coagulating the emotional dispersion by identifying each time an 
object/interlocutor (Rossi Monti & D’Agostino, 2014).  
Secondly, the expression of anger implies the existence of hope. This means that 
anger makes the patient believe that the object, the environment, or reality itself will react to 
the violence of the stimulus, thus assuming the role it had never played or had lost. Anger, in 
fact, is different from resignation; it is a desperate vital reaction that presupposes the 
possibility of a response by an interlocutor. At the same time, anger defends from the pain of 
separation and loss: a mind kept busy by angry fantasies somehow is still clinging to what it 
has lost (Rossi Monti & D’Agostino, 2014). 
Thirdly, anger gives consistency to the self. As anger mounts, the object becomes the 
real reason for pain, thus allowing the person to assume a clear and consistent accusatory role 
towards it. This gives him the possibility of perceiving his own self as cohesive and powerful. 
In other words, anger unravels the fog organizing an undefined and therefore intolerable 
psychic pain: in this state, the patient believes he sees things clearly and knows why he is 
suffering.  
Lastly, anger tests the authenticity of the object. Borderline anger brings the object out 
of the shadow, opens it like a can opener, and forcibly extracts its true nature (Rossi Monti & 
D’Agostino, 2014). This is a sort of load test helpful for evaluating how the object reacts to 
pressure and stress. The objective is to verify the soundness of the other, but also to discover 
its true features, as if only by seeing people bleeding in a traumatic situation the borderline 
patient could see how they really are.  
Alongside anger, the first pathway of situational dysphoria can also organize itself 
into a concrete self-oriented behavior, ending up in non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI) (i.e. 
cutting or burning), already defined as the “behavioral specialty” of the patient with BPD 
(Gunderson & Links, 2008). As we previously delineated through the description of our six 
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“meaning-organizers” for understanding self-injury in BPD (Rossi Monti & D’Agostino, 
2009), NSSI has undoubtedly the “advantage” of positioning negative emotions in a 
behavioral circuit that leads to a state of lowered tension. It is a momentary oasis of peace, a 
sort of discharge to the ground. In other words, cutting the flesh represents an attempt to 
modulate or staunch a negative and oppressive mood condition, precipitating it in a place that 
is objectifiable, delimited, and so also ‘curable’. In summary, it is as if the body could be a 
sort of blowhole from which to let compressed and overwhelming emotions spill out.  
2.4.2 Disorganizing way 
The disorganizing pathway of situational dysphoria ends up in a state of 
disorganization and confusion with respect to personal identity. Tension, irritability, and urge 
cannot break down the dysphoric mood in order to orient it towards a specific object. In this 
sense, dysphoria shows all its “centrifugal” drive, dispersing the various aspects of the self 
instead of aggregating them in some form of recognizable identity. As a result, the vagueness 
of the self contributes to the vagueness of the other, and vice versa, thus affecting also the 
therapeutic relationship. Such state of disorganization can take different forms (sub-
dimensions in the model): affective shifts, identity disturbances, quasi-psychotic experiences 
(i.e., dissociation and paranoid ideation), and emptiness and aloneness. Here we will mainly 
focus on identity disturbances and emptiness as we consider them the most representative 
BPD psychopathological phenomena from the disorganizing point of view. 
Identity disturbances correspond to the basic condition of “identity diffusion” 
theorized by Kernberg (1975, 1984) and described throughout Chapter 1. However, on a 
more intimate level of the self (Meares, Gerull, Stevenson, & Korner, 2011), identity 
diffusion manifests itself in a series of painful experiences of emptiness, insubstantiality, and 
inauthenticity – the lived side of identity diffusion (Rossi Monti, 2016). A patient calls 
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emptiness the “syndrome of the empty mirror” (Ruggiero, 2012); when he tries to imagine a 
mental image of himself, he sees just a black hole that makes the reality of his physical 
existence questionable. However, this emptiness is not a synonym of loss or lack of 
something. In the experience of lack the person suffers from the disappearance of the object 
but in the experience of emptiness the person suffers from a painful incoherence or a 
subjective sense of lack of coherence (Wilkinson-Ryan & Westen, 2000). 
Emptiness has many ways of manifesting itself. Firstly, emptiness can manifest itself 
through the feeling of being inhabited by something dead, which leads the person to live with 
a sense of hopeless desolation. This emptiness is different from the previous one because the 
person identifies aspects of himself as dead or lifeless (i.e. the experience of the “alien self” 
described by Fonagy et al., 2004), and those make him close to finding an intentional object 
with which to converse. Secondly, emptiness can manifest itself as a result of a worn-out 
relationship, when exhausting proximity blurs each other’s boundaries. In this sense, the 
experience of emptiness makes thought disappear and the feeling of self dissolve (Lolli, 
2012).  
Finally, emptiness can manifest itself in a more dramatic way when it characterizes 
not only the patient’s inner world, but even his outside world. In this case, the risk of suicide 
is particularly high, because of the disconnection of dysphoric irritability from the world. 
More frequently, however, the disorganizing dysphoria-emptiness pathway can lead to 
impulsive actions. When the experience of emptiness is equivalent to the experience of 
painful incoherence, impulsive actions give greater cohesion and coherence to the self, 
restoring a sense of vitality (a “desperate vitality”, as described by Stanghellini & Rosfort, 
2013b) and regaining hope. Instead, when the experience of emptiness corresponds to the 
experience of excessive proximity, impulsive actions strongly re-establish the borders of the 
self. 
  
 
Figure 2.3. The new psychopathological-dynamic model for understanding BPD in all its components 
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Figure 2.3. Schematic drawing of the new psychopathological-dynamic model for understanding BPD in all its components. At the basic lived experience level: background dysphoria with its subdimensions (irritability, 
discontent, interpersonal resentment, and surrender) and negative interpersonal disposition with its subdimensions (hostile distrust, interpersonal sensitivity, and impaired empathy); at the here-and-now lived experience 
level: situational dysphoria with its subdimensions (pressure, urge to act, and quasi-explosion); at the symptomatic disturbances level: organizing pathway of symptoms (comprising fears of abandonment, outburst of 
anger, stormy relationships, suicidal and parasuicidal behaviors, and other risky behaviors) and disorganizing pathway of symptoms (comprising affective shifts, identity disturbances, quasi-psychotic experiences, and 
emptiness and aloneness). 
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Chapter 3 
Testing the model: a structural equation modeling analysis 
 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 As evidenced in Chapter 1, borderline personality disorder is one of the most 
challenging disorders to understand and manage in the clinical setting. This is due to several 
reasons: 
1. From a general point of view, there is an imbalance between the high public health 
significance of borderline personality disorder and the low levels of public awareness, 
funded research, and treatment resources associated with the disorder.  
2. From an epidemiological point of view, the prevalence rates of BPD reported in 
literature are not exhaustive or, rather, they may be biased (Gunderson & Hoffman, 
2005). For example, the assumption that BPD is over-represented among women is 
not supported by some recent findings showing an equal prevalence of BPD among 
males and females (Torgersen, 2005; Torgersen, Kringlen, & Kramer, 2001). 
Moreover, although BPD is thought to occur globally, there has been little 
epidemiological research into the disorder outside the Western world (National 
Collaborating Centre for Mental Health, 2009). 
3. From a diagnostic point of view, BPD is very controversial. The BPD diagnosis may 
be misused, overused, or underused because of some problems inherent to the 
disorder and mainly related to the borderline construct, the assessment process, and 
the care context where the disorder is treated.  
4. From a clinical point of view, BPD is characterized by complexity, multiple 
presentations and serious difficulties experienced by mental health professionals in 
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dealing with it. All these problems converge in a multiform symptomatology that is 
highly instable across time and consists of several elements, such as interpersonal 
hypersensitivity, affective dysregulation, impulsivity, and other factors (i.e., identity 
disturbances). 
5. From an etiological point of view, BPD shows multiple causal factors, such as 
genetic, neurobiological and temperamental vulnerability, traumatic childhood, and a 
triggering event or a series of events, such as sexual abuse or other traumatic 
experiences. 
6. From an “economic” point of view, BPD presents considerable costs. Some of these 
are related to heavy utilization of expensive health care resources and persistent lack 
of productivity of these patients. Others are of the emotional kind, and others regard 
the acting out of a variety of dangerous behaviors, such as reckless driving, domestic 
violence, imprisonment, and pathological gambling (Gunderson, 2011). 
 Despite all this, however, there is good news. Although BPD has long been 
considered a chronic and largely untreatable disorder, recent findings show a high remission 
rate (about 45% by 2 years and 85% by 10 years), with remission defined as no more than 
two DSM-5 diagnostic criteria being met for at least 12 months, and a low relapse rate (about 
15%) (Gunderson et al., 2011). Of course, “all that glitters is not gold”; in fact, even after 
remission, many BPD patients have severe functional impairment, with only about 25% of 
patients employed full time and about 40% receiving disability payment after 10 years 
(Gunderson et al., 2011). Further, BPD seems to negatively affect the course and treatment of 
comorbid medical conditions (Rothrock et al., 2007) and other psychiatric disorders (Walter 
et al., 2009). 
 In order to address all these issues, increasing knowledge in borderline personality 
disorder is necessary. In fact, understanding the BPD patient in all his/her complexity is the 
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key to helping both the patient to feel better and the professionals/families to deal with 
him/her, without getting burned out. However, this is still a need for more scientific research. 
The development of a new, psychopathological model of understanding BPD arose from this 
theoretical-clinical gap. As described in Chapter 2, the model focuses on dysphoria. Trying to 
go beyond the description of the symptoms and emphasizing instead the singular experience 
of the borderline patient in terms of subjective consciousness, we argue that dysphoria can be 
seen as a process structuring the BPD experience in multiple, psychopathological pathways 
moving from basic lived experience to symptomatic disturbances (and vice versa), through 
the here-and-now lived experience, thus forming a real “dysphoric cycle”. 
More specifically, we hypothesize that BPD is characterized by an “interpersonal-
affective specialty” that consists of three relevant dimensions: a) background dysphoria and 
b) negative interpersonal disposition (at the basic lived experience level), and c) situational 
dysphoria (at the here-and-now-lived experience level). The variety of abnormal experiences 
(at the symptomatic disturbances level) can be considered as the external side of this 
interpersonal-affective specialty or the final outcome of the whole dysphoric cycle. In fact, 
loaded with background dysphoria and negative interpersonal disposition, and solicited by 
contingent stressful events, situational dysphoria can escape through the following two 
pathways: one disorganizing and another organizing, each ending up in several acute, 
recurrent phenomena (i.e., the nine DSM-5 symptoms). 
The aim of this study was to test the fit of this new, psychopathological-dynamic 
model from an empirical point of view, using structural equation modeling analysis. This 
allowed for a detailed analysis of the clinical weight of each dimension hypothesized as being 
the core features of BPD, together with a deeper understanding of the causal relationship 
among all of them. 
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3.2 Materials and methods 
3.2.1  Participants 
The sample consisted of 105 patients with borderline personality disorder (Group B, 
“BPD patients”; mean age = 36.31 years; SD = 7.02) and 105 healthy controls who did not 
present any DSM-5 formal diagnosis (Group H, “Healthy”; mean age = 33.11 years; SD = 
8.86). Demographic characteristics of Group B and Group H are shown in Table 3.1 and 
Table 3.2. There were no significant differences between the two groups, except for age. 
Participants of Group B were ascertained from adult psychiatric outpatient services 
(75%) and residential inpatient communities (25%). Patients were admitted to the study if 
they: a) met criteria for BPD as assessed by the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV 
Axis II Disorders (SCID-II, also used for DSM-5 diagnosis, given the lack of changes to the 
Personality Disorders Section in DSM-5; First, Gibbon, Spitzer, Williams, & Benjamin, 
1997; Mazzi, Morosini, De Girolamo, & Guaraldi, 2003) (a cutoff of 5 or more was used to 
determine a formal diagnosis of BPD); b) were between the ages of 18 and 65 years. 
Patients were excluded from the study if they also: a) met a lifetime history of or 
current schizophrenia, other psychotic disorders, bipolar affective disorder, intellectual 
disability (i.e., mental retardation) and neurocognitive disorders (i.e., cognitive impairment 
and dementias), as assessed by the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I disorders 
(SCID-I; First, Gibbon, Spitzer, Williams, & Benjamin, 1996; Mazzi, Morosini, De 
Girolamo, Lussetti, & Guaraldi, 2000); b) presented current substance-related disorders 
and/or eating disorder (at least last 6 months), as assessed by SCID I; c) had insufficient 
knowledge of Italian language.  
The general distress of Group B and Group H was also preliminary assessed by the 
Symptom Checklist-90-Revised questionnaire (SCL-90-R; Derogatis, 1994; Sarno, Preti, 
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Prunas, & Madeddu, 2011). The characteristics of both the groups are shown in Table 3.3. 
After complete description of the study to the participants, written informed consent was 
obtained. The study was approved by the local ethics committees. 
 
 
Table 3.1. Means, standard deviations of age (with Anova), nationality, and sexual orientation 
in Group B and Group H  
Group Age Italian No-Italian Heterosexual Homosexual 
 M (SD) F
*
 (p)     
B (n=105) 
 
36.31 (7.02) 
8.40 (.00) 
95.2% 4.8% 97.1% 2.9% 
H (n=105) 33.11 (8.86) 99.0% 1% 100% 0% 
 
Note. *df=1,208. Group B= BPD patients; Group H=Healthy Controls.  
 
 
 
Table 3.2. Level of education in Group B and Group H  
Group 
Primary School 
Level 
Middle School 
Level 
High School 
Level 
University 
Level 
Ph.D.       
Level 
B (n=105) 3.8%     24.8%     53.3% 17.1% 0% 
H (n=105) 
 
1.9% 
 
    24.8% 
 
   43.8% 
 
28.6% 
 
1% 
 
Note. Group B= BPD patients; Group H=Healthy Controls. 
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Table 3.3. ANOVA With Fischer’s F of SCL-90-R Subscales in Group B and Group H 
SCL-90-R Subscales 
BPD 
(n=105) 
Healthy 
(n=105) 
  
 M SD M SD F
* 
p 
Somatization 57.40 12.25 41.25 4.63 159.35 .00 
Obsessive-Compulsive 57.33 8.68 41.64 6.21 226.66 .00 
Interpersonal Sensitivity 67.97 10.35 42.61 5.77 480.02 .00 
Depression 65.87 9.45 43.77 6.88 375.12 .00 
Anxiety 64.88 9.33 44.82 5.89 346.24 .00 
Hostility 70.87 7.29 45.39 8.00 581.45 .00 
Phobic Anxiety 66.40 9.58 46.49 6.97 296.26 .00 
Paranoid Ideation 67.30 8.21 41.49 7.47 566.85 .00 
Psychoticism 55.82 9.24 43.69 4.21 149.75 .00 
Global Severity Index 66.60 8.82 41.69 6.00 571.98 .00 
Note. *df=1,208; Group B=Patients with BPD; Group H=Healthy Controls. 
 
 
 
 
3.2.2  Measures 
 In order to test the validity of the psychopathological-dynamic model for 
understanding BPD, a total of five self-report instruments and one semi-structured interview 
were administered to the participants. The five self-report instruments were: NDS-I, CynDis, 
IIP-47, EQ, and SITDS.  
The Nepean Dysphoria Scale-I (NDS-I; D’Agostino, Manganelli, Aportone, Rossi 
Monti, & Starcevic, 2016) is the Italian validated version of the Nepean Dysphoria Scale 
(NDS; Berle & Starcevic, 2012), developed to measure the severity of dysphoria. It consists 
of 24 items, which are rated for frequency on a five-point Likert scale, from 0 (“not at all”) to 
4 (“always”). A total score is obtained by calculating the mean of the scores on all the items. 
The NDS also provides separate scores on four subscales of dysphoria, as follows: irritability, 
discontent, surrender, and interpersonal resentment.  Every item (except for items 2, 4, 13 and 
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24) starts with the phrase: “Have you felt…” and is followed by a specific feeling (e.g., 
“…discontent?”, “…on edge?”, “…cranky?”). The NDS has shown excellent psychometric 
properties (Berle & Starcevic, 2012), as did the NDS-I (D’Agostino et al., 2016). 
 The Cynical Distrust Scale (CynDis; Julkunen, Salonen, Kaplan, Chesney, & 
Salonen, 1994; Emiliani, Casu, & Gremigni, 2011) is a measure of interpersonal distrust, the 
cognitive component of hostility. It was factor-analytically derived from the Cook-Medley 
Hostility Scale (Cook & Medley, 1954) and consists of eight items such as: “I think most 
people would lie to get ahead”, “Most people inwardly dislike putting themselves out to help 
other people”, or “It is safer to trust nobody”. Response options were altered from the 
original true-false format of the Cook-Medley Hostility Scale to a four-point Likert Scale 
from 1 (“completely disagree”) to 4 (“completely agree”). A total score is obtained by adding 
up item scores. CynDis has shown good psychometric properties (Julkunen et al., 1994), as 
did the Italian version (Emiliani et al, 2011). 
The Inventory of Interpersonal Problems-47 (IIP-47; Pilkonis, Kim, Proietti, & 
Barkham, 1996; Ubbiali, Chiorri, & Donati, 2011) is a measure of chronic interpersonal 
problems associated with personality disorders. It is composed of five subscales: 
Interpersonal Sensitivity, Interpersonal Ambivalence, Aggression, Need for Social Approval, 
and Lack of Sociability. It consists of 47 items, including the following: “I am too sensitive 
to rejection”; “It is hard for me to ignore criticism from other people”, or “I feel too anxious 
when I am involved with another person”. Responses are rated on a five-point scale ranging 
from 0 (“not at all”) to 4 (“extremely distressing”). A total score is obtained by calculating 
the sum of the scores on all the items. The IIP-47 also provides separate scores on the five 
subscales (i.e., the scores on Interpersonal Sensitivity subscale were particularly relevant for 
our study). The IIP-47 has shown very good psychometric properties (Pilkonis et al., 1996), 
as did the Italian version (Ubbiali et al., 2011). 
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The Empathy Quotient (EQ; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Preti et al., 2011) 
is a measure of the cognitive and affective aspects of empathy. It was designed to assess low 
empathy as a feature of psychopathology, so as to be used in clinical setting. It was also 
designed to detect subtle individual differences in empathy in the general population. 
Previous factor analysis indicated three subscales of EQ: cognitive empathy, emotional 
reactivity, and social skills (Lawrence, Show, Baker, Baron-Cohen, & David, 2004). The EQ 
consists of 60 items, with 40 questions tapping empathy (such as the following: “I find it hard 
to know what to do in a social situation”; “I can tell if someone is masking their true 
emotion”; “I find it easy to put myself in somebody else’s shoes”) and 20 filler items 
included to distract the participants from the focus on empathy. Responses are given on a 
four-point Likert scale. Scores can range from 0 to 80 (with a cutoff score of fewer than 30 to 
differentiate adults with autism spectrum disorders). The EQ has shown acceptable 
psychometric properties (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004), as did the Italian version 
(Ubbiali et al., 2011). 
 The Situational Dysphoria Scale (SITDS) was specifically developed to measure 
situational dysphoria (a new construct) for this study. It is composed of 58 items consisting of 
various possible minor events (such as “was ignored by others”, “argued with spouse, 
boyfriend, and so on”, or “had a minor accident”). If the event happened during the previous 
week, the participant had to rate on a five-point Likert scale, from 1 (“not at all”) to 5 (“very 
much”), whether it made him/her: a) feel pressured; b) have a strong urge to do something; c) 
feel as if he/her was about to explode. Items were divided into five clusters: Interpersonal 
Events, Personal Events, Cognitive Events, Environmental Events, and Various Events. 
Three scores were derived from SITDS: a) a total score, by summing up the scores on its sub-
dimensions (pressure, urge to act, and quasi-explosion); b) a dimension-specific score, by 
summing up the scores on each sub-dimension of situational dysphoria (pressure, urge to act, 
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or quasi-explosion); c) an event-specific score, by summing up the scores on each cluster of 
items (interpersonal, personal, cognitive, environmental, or various events). 
 In addition to these five self-report instruments, a semi-structured interview was 
administered: the Borderline Personality Disorder Severity Index-IV Edition (BPDSI-IV; 
Arntz et al., 2003; Madeddu, Prunas, & Riboldi, 2005). The BPDSI-IV was developed to 
assess frequency and severity of BPD manifestations during the last three months. It consists 
of 70 items, divided into nine subscales representing the nine DSM BPD criteria 
(Abandonment, Interpersonal Relationships, Identity, Impulsivity, Parasuicidal Behavior, 
Affective Instability, Emptiness, Outbursts of Anger, and Dissociation and Paranoid 
Ideation). For each item, the frequency of the last three months is rated on an eleven-point 
scale, from 0 (“never”) to 10 (“daily”). Identity disturbance-items form an exception and are 
rated on five-point Likert scales, from 0 (“absent”) to 4 (“dominant, clear and well-defined 
not knowing who he/she is”), multiplied by 2.5. Criteria scores for the nine DSM criteria are 
derived by calculating the mean of the scores on all the items. The total score is the sum of 
the nine criteria scores (range 0–90). The BPDSI-IV has shown excellent psychometric 
properties (Arntz et al., 2003; Giesen-Bloo, Wachters, Schouten, & Arntz, 2010), as did the 
Italian version (Madeddu et al., 2005). 
3.2.3   A two-step procedure 
This was a two-step procedure. The first step involved the development and 
preliminary validation of the Situational Dysphoria Scale (SITDS). The second step was the 
validation of the whole theoretical model for understanding BPD using structural equation 
modeling analysis. These two steps were preceded by a preliminary sample size 
determination through power analysis. 
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Preliminary sample size determination 
A power analysis was preliminarily conducted in order to determine the minimum 
sample size for validating the theoretical model. Power analysis is a relevant aspect of studies 
requiring more complex statistical methods, such as structural equation modeling analysis 
(SEM). Without a proper power analysis, sample size might be too low to find a real effect of 
small magnitude; on the other side, sample size might be also too large and so undesirable 
because it is usually wasteful to spend additional resources on larger samples with only 
marginal benefits (Thoemmes, MacKinnon, & Reiser, 2010).  
Step 1. SITDS development and validation 
 The SITDS development and validation involved a four-stage process, as suggested 
by Furr, 2011 (Box 3.1).  
Box 3.1. The four-stage scale construction process (Furr, 2011) 
I. Articulate construct and context  
II. Choose response format and assemble initial item pool 
III. Collect data from respondents 
IV. Examine psychometric properties and quality 
 
 Stage I: Articulate construct and context  
 Firstly, the construct of situational dysphoria was carefully defined so that it could be 
measured precisely. Secondly, the context in which the construct of situational dysphoria is 
likely to be experience was also articulated, considering two elements: the likely target 
population and the likely administration context. 
 Stage II: Choose response format and assemble initial item pool 
Guided by considerations from the first step, items that seemed relevant to the 
  60 
intended construct were selected and a preliminary item pool including instructions and 
scores was created. The items were also divided into clusters of content, largely derived from 
the Daily Stress Inventory (Brantley & Jones, 1989) and the Weekly Stress Inventory 
(Brantley, Jones, Boudreaux, & Catz, 1997). In addition, according to Furr’s guidelines 
(2011) for “ad hoc scales” (i.e., scales created to measure specific constructs for a study), 
independent raters (i.e., clinical psychologists and psychiatrists) were recruited to evaluate 
the degree to which each item clearly reflected the intended variable in order to produce 
validity-related evidence that goes beyond the scale developers’ opinion and convince the 
readers that the scale is sufficiently valid for narrowly-focused application.  
 Stage III: Collect data from respondents 
 After the construct was defined, the likely assessment context was determined, and 
the preliminary item pool together with instructions and scores were created, the scale was 
administered and data were collected from respondents representing the likely target 
population (BPD patients), in a manner reflecting the likely administration context (mental 
health services and/or residential communities). This was done in order to check for possible 
issues related to the construction of the scale through respondent feedback or observation. 
 Stage IV: Examine psychometric properties and quality 
 Once data were collected from the target population, the final step was to analyze the 
psychometric properties of the SITDS to enhance the possibility that the scale could be useful 
and psychologically informative. A single exploratory factor analysis (principal factor axis in 
SPSS with Promax rotation) was performed on each subscale (Internal Pressure, Urge to Act, 
Quasi-Explosion), with the number of factors constrained to five and then compared to the 
factor analyses performed on the other subscales in order to retain just the items loading on 
the same factor for all the three subscales to ensure homogeneity between the subscales for 
each item scored. Factor structure was “cleaned” following Costello and Osborne’s 
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recommendations for best practices in exploratory factor analysis (2005): item loadings 
above .30, no or few item cross-loadings, and no factors with fewer than three items. A 
second exploratory factor analysis (principal factor axis in SPSS with Promax rotation) was 
then conducted on the derived item pool of SITDS in order to see how many factors to retain. 
The analysis was repeated with different extraction/rotation methods (i.e., maximum 
likelihood and principal axis with Varimax or Promax rotation) in order to check the results. 
Subsequent issues related to a strong common factor dominating the other factors were 
addressed empirically using a hierarchical cluster analysis (Ward’s method), per Raise, 
Waller, and Comrey (2000). The coefficient of internal consistency (Cronbach’s α value) for 
the whole SITDS, for each cluster, and for each subscale was also calculated. Finally, 
convergent and discriminant validity of the SITDS was examined by means of parametric 
Pearson’s correlations between the scores on the SITDS and its subscales and scores on other 
instruments (some instruments were similar in terms of the construct measured, such as NDS-
I, and some others were different in terms of the construct measured, such as CynDis, IIP-47, 
EQ, and BPDSI-IV). All statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS for Window, version 
19.0. 
Step 2. Validation of the theoretical model  
 The validation of the theoretical model involved a two-stage process (Box 3.2). 
Box 3.2. The two-stage process for validating the theoretical model 
I. Checking for normality 
II. Testing the model 
 
Stage I: Checking for normality 
As one of the assumptions for using SEM is that data must follow a normal 
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distribution, checking normality for both the BPD and the healthy controls samples was 
needed before performing SEM analysis. According to Kline (2011), a variable is normally 
distributed if its skewness index (i.e., skewness statistic/standard error) is less than three and 
if its kurtosis index (i.e., kurtosis statistic/standard error) is less than 20. The variables found 
as being highly skewed were transformed using a natural log function (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007) in order to be used. Multivariate normality was assessed via Mardia’s coefficient.  
Stage II: Testing the model 
 After having conducted preliminary analyses, structural equation modeling (SEM) 
was performed to analyze data. According to Anderson and Gerbing (1988), a two-step 
procedure was followed to test the proposed model. The measurement model was tested first 
via a confirmatory factor analysis. Once the model had acceptable fit, its constructs were 
tested for convergent and discriminant validity. Thereafter, the structural model was tested. 
As suggested by Kline (2011), the fit of both the measurement and structural models was 
assessed via the chi-square statistic and the fit indices shown in Table 3.4. Kline (2011) 
pointed out that the Normed Chi-square (chi square/df) should not be reported because it is 
not statistically sound and no acceptable thresholds have been agreed upon. Nevertheless, it is 
reported since most researchers include it in their evaluations of model fit. The study 
hypotheses were evaluated via the proposed structural model. All statistical analyses were 
conducted using AMOS 23.0. 
Table 3.4. Fit indices and their threshold values 
Index Threshold Reference 
 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 
Standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) 
 
> .95 
< .06 
< .08 
 
Hu & Bentler, 1999 
Brown & Cudeck, 1993 
Hu & Bentler, 1999 
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3.3 Results 
Preliminary sample size determination 
Table 3.5 presents six possible models and their respective degrees of freedom. Using 
MacCallum, Browne, and Sugawara’s (1996) RMSEA test of close fit with εa < .05, ε1 = .08, 
α = .05, the minimum sample size needed to attain statistical power of .80 ranged from 56 to 
153. Given that our theoretical model was composed of five latent constructs, with an 
average of four indicator variables for each construct, a minimum N of 97 was needed for the 
study (our sample was composed of 105 BPD patients and 105 controls).  
 
Table 3.5. Minimum sample size as a function of degrees of freedom 
            Model df Minimum N 
Five latent constructs 
   Three indicators 
   Four indicators 
   Five indicators 
Six latent constructs 
   Three indicators 
   Four indicators 
   Five indicators 
 
80 
160 
265 
 
120 
237 
390 
  
   153 
97 
71 
 
116 
76 
56 
 
       Note. Assumptions are εa < .05, ε1 = .08, α = .05, and β = .80. 
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SITDS development and validation 
Stage I: Articulate construct and context 
 Situational dysphoria was defined as “a state of internal pressure, urge to act, feeling 
of quasi-explosion, characterized by a marked reactive component and so strongly dependent 
on situational triggers that can be personal, but especially interpersonal and environmental.” 
BPD patients were indicated as the likely target population and clinical and/or research 
contexts were also indicated as the likely administration context. 
Stage II: Choose response format and assemble initial item pool 
A preliminary over-inclusive item pool of 58 items was created. Items consisted of 
various, minor events that could possibly happen during week (such as “was ignored by 
others”, “argued with spouse or girlfriend/boyfriend”, or “had a minor accident”) and were 
divided into five clusters of content: Interpersonal Events, Personal Events, Cognitive Events, 
Environmental Events, and Various Events. Items were rated on three subscales (Internal 
Pressure, Urge to Act, and Quasi-Explosion) based on a five-point Likert scale from 1 (“Not 
at all”) to 5 (“Very much”). In summary, the preliminary over-inclusive SITDS version was 
composed of 58 items for three subscales (for a total of 127 items), each rated on a five-
Likert scale for a maximum score of 15 per item. A picture of the SITDS format with 
instructions, scores, and the first item (translated in English for this thesis) is shown in Figure 
3.1.  
Three scores were derived from SITDS: a) Total score, by summing up the scores on 
its sub-dimensions (Internal Pressure, Urge to Act, and Quasi-Explosion); b) Dimension-
specific score, by summing up the scores on each sub-dimension of situational dysphoria 
(Internal Pressure, Urge to Act, or Quasi-Explosion); c) Event-specific score, by summing up 
the scores on each cluster of items (Interpersonal, Personal, Cognitive, Environmental, or 
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Various Events). 
Figure 3.1. Picture of SITDS format with instructions, scores, and the first item 
 
 
 
Stage III: Collect data from respondents 
 Data coming from the target population (Group B=105 BPD patients) were collected 
in clinical administration contexts (mental health services and/or residential communities) in 
order to validate and eventually revise the developed scale. 
Stage IV: Examine psychometric properties and quality 
 The comparison among the exploratory factor analyses performed on each subscale 
with the number of factors constrained to five led to us eliminating 30 items (3, 7, 8, 11-14, 
16, 19-25, 27-29, 31, 32, 39, 40, 43, 44, 47, 48, 50, 51, 53, and 58) not loading on the same 
factor for all the three subscales. Thus, the final scale consisted of 28 items (1, 2, 4-6, 9, 10, 
15, 17, 18, 26, 30, 33-38, 41, 42, 45, 46, 49, 52, and 54-57. (Table 3.6). 
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Table 3.6. Disposition of the 58 items of SITDS in factors and subscales (red-shaded 
items were excluded, whereas green-shaded items were retained) 
  
Note. IP = Internal Pressure; UA = Urge to Act; QE = Quasi Explosion; 0 = no factor loading above .30.  
  
 
 The exploratory factor analysis (principal axis factoring with Promax rotation) 
conducted on the derived 28-item SITDS showed a strong common factor (Factor 1) 
dominating the other factors; subsequent factor analyses repeated with different 
extraction/rotation methods confirmed these results (Table 3.7).  
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Table 3.7. Disposition of the 28 items of SITDS in factors across different factor 
extraction/rotation methods  
 
Item 
 
ML with Promax  ML with Varimax  PA with Varimax  PA with Promax  
F1 F2 F3 F4 F1 F2 F3 F4 F1 F2 F3 F4 F1 F2 F3 F4 
1   X    X   X    X   
2 X    X    X    X    
4 X    X    X    X    
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    X    X 
6   X    X   X   X    
9 X    X    X    0 0 0 0 
10   X    X  X    0 0 0 0 
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   X  X    
17 X    X    X      X  
18    X    X   X  X    
26 X    X    X     X   
30   X    X   X   X    
33 X    X    X    X    
34 X    X    X    X    
35  X    X   X    X    
36  X    X   X    X    
37  X    X   X    X    
38 X    X    X    X    
41 X    X    X    X    
42 X    X    X    X    
45   X    X   X    X   
46 X    X    X    X    
49    X    X   X    X  
52    X    X   X    X  
54 X    X    X    X    
55  X    X   X    X    
56 X    X    X    X    
57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    X    X 
Tot.  13 4 5 3 13 4 5 3 18 4 4 2 18 3 3 2 
 
Note. ML = Maximum Likelihood; PA = Principal Axis; F1 = Factor 1; F2 = Factor 2; F3 = Factor 3; F4 = 
Factor 4; 0 = no factor loading above .30. 
 
 Hierarchical cluster analysis conducted on the 28-item SITDS identified instead three 
clusters cutting the brunches of the tree at 8.5 (Figure 3.2). Cluster 1, composed of items: 5, 
15, 18, 26, 37, 41, 49, 52, and 54-56 (a total of 11 items); Cluster 2 composed of items: 1, 6, 
17, 30, 35, 36, 45, 46, and 57 (a total of 9 items); Cluster 3 composed of items: 2, 4, 9, 10, 33, 
34, 38, 42 (a total of 8 items). 
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Figure 3.2.  Dendrogram using Ward’s method and showing the clustering of SITDS  
 
 
 The Cronbach’s α value calculated on the whole 28 x 3-item SITDS was .89, 
suggesting very good internal consistency. The Cronbach’s α value calculated on each cluster 
was also very good (Cluster 1 Cronbach’s α value = .79; Cluster 2 Cronbach’s α value = .84; 
Cluster 3 Cronbach’s α value = .95). But the Cronbach’s α value calculated on each subscale 
was questionable (“Internal Pressure” Cronbach’s α value = .66; “Urge to Act” Cronbach’s α 
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value = .67; “Quasi-Explosion” Cronbach’s α value = .68). However, a more detailed item 
analysis showed that, eliminating items 5 (“Was forced to socialize”), 26 (“Worried about 
another’s problems”), 54 (“Was stared at”), and 55 (“Ran out of food/personal articles”) (all 
belonging to Cluster 1), the Cronbach’s α value for the whole 24 x 3-item scale increased to 
excellent value (from .89 to .91), the Cronbach’s α value for Cluster 1 increased to very good 
value (from .79 to .81), and the Cronbach’s α value for each subscale increased each to 
acceptable values (“Internal Pressure” Cronbach’s α value = .71; “Urge to Act” Cronbach’s α 
value = .73; “Quasi-Explosion” Cronbach’s α value = .73). As all the four critical items were 
also not relevant in content for Cluster 1, we decided to eliminate them from the final version 
of SITDS.  
 Inspection of the remaining items in each of the three clusters indicated that the first 
cluster could be considered a “Personal Events” cluster (including items such as: “Did 
something I am unskilled at”, “Performed poorly at sport/game”, and “Hurried to meet a 
deadline”); the second, an “Environmental Events” cluster (including items: “Was interrupted 
during task/activity”, “Had car trouble”, and “Experienced illness or physical discomfort”; 
and the third, an “Interpersonal Events” cluster (including items: “Was ignored by others”, 
“Argued with spouse, boyfriend/girlfriend, etc.”, and “Someone spoiled my completed task”. 
Correlations among the three clusters are reported in Table 3.8. They show a moderate 
positive correlation between the “Environmental Events” cluster and the “Interpersonal 
Events” Cluster (rs = .45) and a very weak but still significant negative correlation between 
the “Personal Events” cluster and the “Interpersonal Events” cluster (rs = -.12), thus 
suggesting that the three clusters are representative of similar and opposite tendencies, all 
related to the underlying construct (situational dysphoria). 
Correlations among the three subscales are reported in Table 3.9. They show very 
strong positive correlations (rs = .98), thus suggesting that they are representative of the 
  70 
underlying construct. 
 
Table 3.8. SITDS clusters correlations matrix 
Pearson’s correlations 
 1. Personal Events 2. Environmental Events 3. Interpersonal Events 
1. Personal Events  1 .06 -.12 ** 
2. Environmental Events .06 1 .45 ** 
3. Interpersonal Events -.12 ** .45 ** 1 
   Note. N=105. * p< .05 ; ** p< .01. 
  
 
Table 3.9. SITDS subscales correlations matrix 
Pearson’s correlations 
 1. Internal Pressure 2. Urge to Act 3. Quasi-Explosion 
1. Internal Pressure  1 .98 ** .98 ** 
2. Urge to Act .98 ** 1 .98 ** 
3. Quasi-Explosion .98 ** .98 ** 1 
   Note. N=105. * p< .05 ; ** p< .01. 
  
 
 The content of each item was then revised in order to clarify the meaning in 
accordance with the belonging cluster. The final version of SITDS (showed at the end of this 
Chapter) consisted of 24 items (divided into three clusters: Personal Events, Interpersonal 
Events, and Environmental Events), each of them rated on three subscales (Internal Pressure, 
Urge to Act, and Quasi-Explosion).  
 Table 3.10 summarizes the correlations between scores on the final 24x3-item SITDS 
and its subscales and scores on the other instruments. The SITDS total score and scores on its 
subscales showed medium to strong Pearson’s correlations with NDS-I scores (rs ranging 
from .54 to .63). The correlations with CynDis total score (rs ranging from .39 to .65), IIP-47 
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total score (rs ranging from .23 to .51), EQ (rs ranging from -.28 to -.22, excluding Internal 
Pressure and Urge to Act), and BPDSI-IV (rs ranging from .29 to .45) were weaker, but still 
noteworthy. 
 
T Table 3.10. Correlations between scores on the SITDS and its subscales and scores on other measures 
    Pearson’s correlations 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 
1. Internal Pressure (SITDS) 1 .98 ** .98 ** .80 ** .54 ** .39 **  .23 *   -.18   .45 * 
2. Urge to Act (SITDS) .98 ** 1 .98 ** .83 ** .55 ** .45 **   .30 **   -.16 .43 ** 
3. Quasi-Explosion (SITDS) .98 ** .98 ** 1 .83 ** .58 ** .46 **   .30 **   -.22 * .44 ** 
4. SITDS .80 ** .83 ** .83 ** 1 .63 ** .65 **   .51 **  -.28 ** .29 ** 
5. NDS-I .54 ** .55 ** .58 ** .63 ** 1 .53 **   .50 **  -.35 ** .31 ** 
6. CynDis  .39 ** .45 ** .46 ** .65 ** .53 ** 1   .70 ** -.23 * .10 
7. IIP-47   .23* .30 ** .30 ** .51 ** .50 ** .70 ** 1 -.24 * -.07 
8. EQ  -.18 -.16 -.22 * -.28 ** -.35 ** -.23 * -.24 * 1 -.09 
9. BPDS-IV .45 ** .43 ** .44 ** .29 ** .31 ** .10 -.07 -.09 1 
Note. N=105. * p< .05; ** p< .01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  72 
Validation of the theoretical model 
Results for the BPD patients 
Stage I: Checking for normality  
 Univariate normality 
As displayed in Table 3.11, the Background Dysphoria and Negative Interpersonal 
Disposition indicators had a skewness index above three and so they were transformed. The 
skewness index of the transformed variables fell below three; therefore, these transformed 
variables were used in subsequent procedures.   
  
Table 3.11. Skewness and kurtosis values for the study variables (N = 105) 
  
Skewness 
 
Kurtosis 
Variable 
 
Statistic Index Statistic Index 
 
Background dysphoria 
   Irritability 
   Discontent 
   Interpersonal resentment 
   Surrender 
Negative interpersonal disposition 
   Hostile distrust 
   Interpersonal sensitivity 
   Impaired empathy 
Situational dysphoria 
   Pressure 
   Urge to act 
   Quasi-explosion 
Organizing 
   Fears of abandonment 
   Outbursts of anger 
   Stormy relationships 
   Parasuicidal behaviors 
   Other risky behaviors 
Disorganizing 
   Affective shifts 
   Identity disturbances 
   Dissociation and paranoid ideation 
   Emptiness and aloneness 
 
 
    -2.18 
    -1.22 
    -2.41 
    -1.97 
 
     -.99 
     -.97 
      .99 
 
     -.72 
     -.70 
     -.87 
 
     -.39 
     -.10 
     -.63 
      .76 
      .07 
 
     -.85 
     -.58 
      .70 
     -.80 
 
 
    -9.11 
    -5.12 
  -10.08 
    -8.25 
 
    -4.15 
    -4.04 
     4.14 
 
    -3.01 
    -2.95 
    -3.64 
 
    -1.61 
      -.42 
    -2.64 
     3.17 
       .30 
 
      -.85 
      -.58 
     2.91 
    -3.37 
 
 
      8.68 
      1.50 
      9.85 
      5.56 
 
      -.07 
     1.07 
     4.35 
 
     1.44 
     1.24 
     1.89 
 
     -.40 
     -.73 
     -.28 
      .30 
     -.64 
 
      .53 
      .54 
      .40 
      .06 
 
 
    18.58 
      3.20 
    21.07 
    11.90 
 
       -.15 
      2.29 
      9.92 
 
      3.07 
      2.65 
      4.05 
 
      -.86 
    -1.56 
      -.59 
       .65 
    -1.37 
 
     1.12 
     1.16 
       .86 
       .13 
Note. SE for skewness statistic = .24; SE for kurtosis statistic = .47. 
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 Multivariate normality 
 Mardia’s coefficient was, z = 11.25. Kline (2011) notes, however, that such a test 
often yields statistically significant results. Kline further points out that one can detect 
multivariate non-normality by assessing univariate normality. Since all the variables were 
distributed normally, the assumption of multivariate normality was met.  
Stage II: Testing the model  
 Results for the measurement model 
 Proposed measurement model. The measurement model, depicted in Figure 3.3, did 
not fit the data well. As shown in Table 3.12, the values of all the fit indices did not meet 
their acceptable thresholds; the CFI was .92, the SRMR was .09, and the RMSEA was .09. 
Except for Empathy, all indicator variables loaded significantly onto their respective 
constructs. Because the model did not fit the data well, it was revised; only indicator 
variables with standardized factor loadings above .60 were retained (Hair, Black, Babin, & 
Anderson, 2009). Based on these criteria, several variables were deleted: Empathy, 
Parasuicidal Behaviors, Other Risky Behaviors, Identity Disturbances, and Quasi-Psychotic 
Experiences.  
 
Table 3.12. Fit indices for the measurement models 
Index Proposed Best-Fitting 
 
Chi-square 
Degrees of freedom 
Probability level 
Normed chi-square 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 
   Lower bound 90% confidence interval 
   Upper bound 90% confidence interval 
   P-close 
Standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) 
 
260.31 
142 
.00 
1.83 
.92 
.09 
.07 
.11 
.00 
.09 
  
115.67 
67 
.00 
1.73 
.96 
.08 
.06 
.11 
.02 
.06 
 
Note. At p < .001, critical χ2crit (75) = 118.60. 
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Best-fitting measurement model. The fit indices for the revised measurement model 
are summarized in Table 3.12 while the revised measurement model is depicted in Figure 3.4. 
This model fit the data well as it met all but one of the criteria for good fit: the CFI value was 
above .95 and the SRMR was only .06. Further, the change in chi-square between the 
proposed and revised model was statistically significant, Δχ2 (75) = 144.64, p < .001. In 
addition, as shown in Table 3.13, all item indicators loaded on significantly to their respective 
constructs. Therefore, the convergent and discriminant validity of the constructs of this 
revised model were assessed.  
 Convergent validity of constructs. The composite reliability and the average variance 
extracted were used to measure the convergent validity of the constructs. Constructs have 
convergent validity when the composite reliability exceeds the criterion of .70 (Hair, et al., 
2010) and the average variance extracted (AVE) is above .50 (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988). As 
shown in Table 3.13, the composite reliability values of all the constructs were above .70. 
Further, all the AVE values were all above .50. Thus, all the constructs had convergent 
validity. 
 Discriminant validity of constructs. Discriminant validity was assessed by comparing 
the absolute value of the correlations between the constructs and the square root of the 
average variance extracted by a construct. When the correlations are lower than the square 
root of the average variance extracted by a construct, constructs are said to have discriminant 
validity (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). The findings in Table 3.14 reveal that Background 
Dysphoria, Negative Interpersonal Disposition, and Situational Dysphoria had discriminant 
validity. But because the correlation between the Organizing and Disorganizing constructs (r 
= .84, p < .001) was higher than the square roots of their AVE values, these constructs did not 
demonstrate discriminant validity. 
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Figure 3.3. Standardized coefficients for the proposed measurement model 
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Figure 3.4. Standardized coefficients for the best-fitting measurement model 
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Table 3.13. Convergent validity for the constructs  
 
Construct 
 
 
SFL 
 
CR 
 
AVE 
 
Background dysphoria 
   Irritability 
   Discontent 
   Interpersonal resentment 
   Surrender 
Negative interpersonal disposition 
   Hostile distrust 
   Interpersonal sensitivity 
Situational dysphoria 
   Pressure 
   Urge to act 
   Quasi-explosion 
Organizing 
   Fears of abandonment 
   Outbursts of anger 
   Stormy relationships 
Disorganizing 
   Affective shifts 
   Emptiness 
 
 
 
.78 
.68 
.80 
.73 
 
.78 
.75 
 
.99 
.99 
.99 
 
.72 
.66 
.76 
 
.73 
.61 
 
.83 
 
 
 
 
.74 
 
 
 
.99 
 
 
.77 
 
 
 
.74 
 
.63 
 
 
 
 
.65 
 
 
 
.98 
 
 
.59 
 
 
 
.55 
Note. SFL = standardized factor loading. CR = composite reliability; AVE = average variance extracted;  
All items loaded significantly onto their respective constructs, p < .001. 
 
 
Table 3.14. Discriminant validity results for the final measurement model  
 
Construct 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 Background dysphoria 
2 Negative interpersonal disposition 
3 Situational dysphoria 
4 Organizing 
5 Disorganizing 
 
.79 
.60 
.60 
.55 
.37 
 
 
*** 
*** 
*** 
** 
 
 
.81 
.55 
.28 
.20 
 
 
 
 
*** 
* 
 
 
 
 
.99 
.48 
.63 
 
 
 
 
 
*** 
*** 
 
 
 
 
.77 
.84 
 
 
 
 
 
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
.74 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. The values of the square root of the average variance extracted are on the diagonal; all other entries 
are the correlations.  
*
 p < .05. 
**
 p < .01. 
***
 p < .001. 
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 Results for the structural model 
 Proposed structural model. The proposed structural model, depicted in Figure 3.5, did 
not fit the data very well but had close-to-acceptable fit. As shown in Table 3.15, the CFI was 
close-to-acceptable and the SRMR and RMSEA were in the mediocre range. The findings in 
Table 3.16 reveal, moreover, that all the path coefficients were significant and in the 
predicted direction.  
 
Figure 3.5. Standardized coefficients for the proposed structural model 
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Table 3.15. Fit indices for the structural model 
 
Index 
 
 
Proposed 
 
Revised 
 
Chi-square 
Degrees of freedom 
Probability level 
Normed chi-square 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 
   Lower bound 90% confidence interval 
   Upper bound 90% confidence interval 
   P-close 
Standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) 
 
 
242.10 
129 
.00 
1.88 
.92 
.09 
.07 
.11 
.00 
.10 
  
128.31 
71 
.00 
1.81 
.95 
.09 
.06 
.11 
.01 
.08 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.16. Unstandardized and standardized path coefficients for the proposed structural 
model  
 
Path 
 
 
   B 
 
 SE 
 
β 
 
t 
 
Background dysphoria to situational dysphoria 
Negative disposition to situational dysphoria 
Situational dysphoria to organizing 
Situational dysphoria to disorganizing 
 
 
8.77 
6.76 
.03 
.02 
 
 
3.08 
3.21 
.01 
.00 
 
.38 
.30 
.51 
.49 
 
2.85 
2.11 
4.70 
4.17 
 
** 
* 
*** 
*** 
*
 p < .05. 
**
 p < .01. 
***
 p < .001. 
 
Best-fitting structural model. The best-fitting structural model, illustrated in Figure 
3.6, fit the data well. As shown in Table 3.15, all but the RMSEA met the criterion for 
acceptability. The findings in Table 3.17 reveal, moreover, that all the path coefficients were 
significant and in the predicted direction. 
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Figure 3.6. Standardized coefficients for the best-fitting structural model 
 
 
 
Table 3.17. Unstandardized and standardized path coefficients for the best-fitting structural 
model  
 
Path 
 
 
  B 
 
 SE 
 
β 
 
t 
 
Background dysphoria to situational dysphoria 
Negative disposition to situational dysphoria 
Situational dysphoria to organizing 
Situational dysphoria to disorganizing 
 
 
8.64 
7.26 
.03 
.03 
 
2.92 
3.04 
.01 
.01 
 
.38 
.32 
.49 
.63 
 
2.96 
2.39 
4.26 
5.59 
 
** 
* 
*** 
*** 
*
 p < .05. 
**
 p < .01. 
***
 p < .001. 
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Results for the healthy controls 
Stage I: Checking for normality 
 Univariate normality. The findings in Table 3.18 reveal that all but the Empathy 
variable had a skewness index above three and so they were transformed. The skewness 
index of the transformed variables fell below three; therefore, these transformed variables 
were used in subsequent procedures. 
 
Table 3.18. Skewness and kurtosis values for the study variables (N = 105)  
  
Skewness 
 
Kurtosis 
Variable 
 
Statistic Index Statistic Index 
 
Background dysphoria 
   Irritability 
   Discontent 
   Interpersonal resentment 
   Surrender 
Negative interpersonal disposition 
   Hostile distrust 
   Interpersonal sensitivity 
   Impaired empathy 
Situational dysphoria 
   Internal pressure 
   Urge to act 
   Quasi-explosion 
Organizing 
   Fears of abandonment 
   Outbursts of anger 
   Stormy relationships 
   Other risky behaviors 
Disorganizing 
   Affective shifts 
   Identity disturbances 
   Dissociation and paranoid ideation 
   Emptiness and aloneness 
 
 
 
    1.25 
    1.34 
    1.87 
    1.55 
 
     .79 
   1.23 
    -.70 
 
   2.02 
   2.21 
   2.49 
 
   2.81 
   3.23 
   2.16 
   3.31 
 
   1.96 
   1.57 
   3.63 
   3.84 
 
 
     5.32 
     5.69 
     7.94 
     6.56 
 
     3.36 
     5.23 
    -2.96 
 
     8.57 
     9.39 
   10.55 
 
   11.90 
   13.71 
     9.16 
   14.06 
 
    8.30 
    6.65 
   15.41 
   16.31 
 
 
      1.26 
      1.68 
      3.22 
      1.64 
 
       -.02 
      1.12 
        .52 
 
      4.77 
      5.31 
      6.84 
 
    12.06 
    11.60 
      5.84 
    14.07 
 
      3.95 
      2.01 
    13.12 
    16.08 
 
 
     2.69 
     3.59 
     6.89 
     3.51 
 
     -.04 
    2.39 
    1.12 
 
   10.21 
   11.37 
   14.63 
 
   25.82 
   24.82 
   12.49 
   30.10 
 
    8.46 
    4.30 
  28.07 
  34.41 
Note. SE for skewness statistic = .24; SE for kurtosis statistic = .47. 
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 Multivariate normality. Mardia’s coefficient was, z = 12.40. Kline (2011) notes, 
however, that such a test often yields statistically significant results. Kline further points out 
that one can detect multivariate non-normality by assessing univariate normality. Since all the 
variables were distributed normally, the assumption of multivariate normality was met.  
Stage II: Testing the model  
Results for the measurement model 
 Proposed measurement model. Because all participants had zero parasuicidal 
behaviors, this variable was not included in the model tests. The proposed measurement 
model yielded a non-positive definite matrix. Correlations between constructs were examined 
for extreme collinearity. Background Dysphoria and Negative Interpersonal Disposition were 
highly correlated (r = .99, p < .001); Organizing and Disorganizing were also highly 
correlated (r = .99, p < .001). Therefore, these constructs were combined into a single 
construct. The resulting measurement model, depicted in Figure 3.7, did not fit the data well 
(see Table 3.19) and was revised; only indicator variables with standardized factor loadings 
above .60 were retained (Hair, et al., 2009). Several variables were deleted: Empathy, Stormy 
Relationships, and Emptiness.  
Table 3.19. Fit indices for the measurement models 
Index Proposed Best-Fitting 
 
Chi-square 
Degrees of freedom 
Probability level 
Normed chi-square 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 
   Lower bound 90% confidence interval 
   Upper bound 90% confidence interval 
   P-close 
Standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) 
 
289.46 
87 
.00 
3.33 
.86 
.15 
.13 
.17 
.00 
.09 
  
179.14 
51 
.00 
3.51 
.90 
.16 
.13 
.18 
.00 
.08 
 
Note. At p < .001, critical χ2crit (36) = 67.99. 
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Figure 3.7. Standardized coefficients for the proposed measurement model 
 
 
Best-fitting measurement model. The fit indices for the revised measurement model 
are summarized in Table 3.19 while the measurement model is depicted in Figure 3.8. 
Although this model had better fit than the proposed model, Δχ2 (36) = 110.32, p < .001, it 
still did not fit the data well. But, as shown in Table 3.20, all item indicators loaded on 
significantly to their respective constructs. Since this model fit the data better, the convergent 
and discriminant validity of the constructs of this revised model were assessed.  
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 Convergent validity of constructs. As shown in Table 3.20, the composite reliability 
values of all the constructs were above .70. Further, all the AVE values were all above .50. 
Thus, all the constructs had convergent validity. 
 Discriminant validity of constructs. The findings in Table 3.21 reveal that none of the 
constructs demonstrated discriminant validity. The correlations between the constructs were 
higher than their respective AVE values. 
 
Figure 3.8. Standardized coefficients for the best-fitting measurement model 
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Table 3.20. Convergent validity for the constructs  
 
Construct 
 
 
SFL 
 
CR 
 
AVE 
 
Background dysphoria/negative interpersonal disposition 
   Irritability 
   Discontent 
   Interpersonal resentment 
   Surrender 
   Hostile distrust 
   Interpersonal sensitivity 
Situational dysphoria 
   Internal pressure 
   Urge to act 
   Quasi-explosion 
Organizing/disorganizing 
   Outbursts of anger 
   Affective shifts 
   Emptiness 
 
 
.79 
.68 
.90 
.66 
.71 
.62 
 
.98 
.99 
.97 
 
.63 
.57 
.91 
 
.87 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.99 
 
 
 
.75 
 
.61 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.96 
 
 
 
.59 
 
Note. SFL = standardized factor loading. CR = composite reliability; AVE = average variance extracted; All 
items loaded significantly onto their respective constructs, p < .001. 
 
 
Table 3.21. Discriminant validity results for the final measurement model  
 
Construct 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
1 Background dysphoria and negative interpersonal disposition 
2 Situational dysphoria 
3 Organizing and disorganizing 
 
 
.78 
.69 
.88 
 
 
*** 
*** 
 
 
.98 
.91 
 
 
 
*** 
 
 
 
.77 
 
Note. The values of the square root of the average variance extracted are on the diagonal; all other entries are the 
correlations.  
*
 p < .05. 
**
 p < .01. 
***
 p < .001. 
 
 Results for the structural model 
 The structural model, depicted in Figure 3.9, did not fit the data well. As shown in 
Table 3.22, none of the fit indices met their respective thresholds for acceptable model fit. 
The findings in Table 3.23 reveal, however, that all the path coefficients were significant. 
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Figure 3.9. Standardized coefficients for the structural model 
 
 
 
Table 3.22. Fit indices for the structural model 
 
Index 
 
 
Values 
 
Chi-square 
Degrees of freedom 
Probability level 
Normed chi-square 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 
   Lower bound 90% confidence interval 
   Upper bound 90% confidence interval 
   P-close 
Standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) 
 
 
208.75 
52 
.00 
4.01 
.88 
.17 
.15 
.20 
.00 
.11 
 
 
 
Table 3.23. Unstandardized and standardized path coefficients for the structural model  
 
Path 
 
 
    B 
 
   SE 
 
β 
 
t 
 
Background dysphoria/negative interpersonal disposition  
     to situational dysphoria 
Situational dysphoria to organizing/disorganizing 
 
 
44.32 
 
.01 
 
  7.50 
 
  .00 
 
.69 
 
.91 
 
5.91 
 
6.81 
 
*** 
 
*** 
 
*
 p < .05. 
**
 p < .01. 
***
 p < .001. 
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3.4 Discussion 
SITDS development and validation 
 This study aimed to develop and validate a scale for assessing situational dysphoria in 
borderline patients (the Situational Dysphoria Scale, SITDS). To this end, the SITDS was 
firstly developed and then administered to a sample of 105 patients, ascertained from 
inpatient and outpatient services, who met criteria for BPD as assessed by the Structured 
Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis II Disorders (SCID-II). A preliminary over-inclusive 58-
item SITDS was firstly created. Then it was administered to the BPD sample, along with 
other conceptually similar (Nepean Dysphoria Scale) and conceptually distinct (Cynical 
Distrust Scale, Inventory of Interpersonal Problems-47, Empathy Quotient, and Borderline 
Personality Severity Index-IV) instruments. The psychometric characteristics (reliability, 
internal structure, convergent and divergent validity) of the SITDS were then examined and a 
final 24-item SITDS was developed.  
The results of the study show that Situational Dysphoria Scale (SITDS) has a factor 
structure consistent with the proposed theoretical concept of situational dysphoria. According 
to our hypothesis, situational dysphoria is a temporary, overwhelming state characterized by 
three prevalent sub-dimensions (internal pressure, urge to act, and quasi-explosion), and very 
dependent on situational triggers (personal, interpersonal, and environmental). In this sense, 
the SITDS appeared to measure situational dysphoria by quantifying the severity with which 
several situational triggers (personal, interpersonal, and environmental) cause internal 
pressure, urge to act, and/or a feeling of quasi-explosion in the patient. An excellent overall 
internal consistency and a very good internal consistency at the cluster- and sub-scale level 
further support the conceptual coherence of the SITDS.  
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Although the associations between scores on the SITDS and scores on the measure of 
background dysphoria (NDS-I) suggest a degree of overlap, results of this study support the 
notion that situational dysphoria and background dysphoria are distinct constructs, as we 
hypothesized (and discussed in greater detail in the next paragraph). Weaker but still 
significant correlations between scores on the SITDS and scores on the measures of hostile 
distrust (CynDis), chronic interpersonal problems (IIP-47), empathy (EQ – excluding the 
subscales of Internal Pressure and Urge to Act), and BPD manifestations (BPDSI-IV) suggest 
that the concept of situational dysphoria is different from but related to these dimensions, and 
particularly to hostile distrust.  
This is consistent both with previous findings emphasizing the role of dysfunctional 
beliefs (especially interpersonal distrust) in mood instability of BPD (Arntz et al., 1999; 
Barnow et al., 2009; Beck et al., 2004; Bhar et al., 2008) and with our hypothesis that 
situational dysphoria is related, on the one hand, to a negative interpersonal disposition 
(composed of hostile distrust, interpersonal sensitivity, and impaired empathy) and, on the 
other, to various BPD symptoms. However, there is need to include other measures in further 
studies of the psychometric properties of the SITDS to better delineate the relationship 
between situational dysphoria and other constructs. 
Finally, the SITDS needs to be tested in clinical samples consisting of individuals 
with disorders related to dysphoria other than borderline personality disorder (i.e., major 
depressive disorder, dysthymic disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder) in order to see if 
the concept of situational dysphoria can be generalized to other clinical conditions or not. 
Demonstrating that situational dysphoria exists only in BPD patients would lend further 
credence to the validity of the SITDS but also to the hypothesis that situational dysphoria is 
(relatively) specific for BPD. In summary, the present study provides preliminary support for 
the use of the SITDS. This measure may allow practitioners to assess dysphoria in a more 
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nuanced and conceptually coherent way, thereby differentiating between situational and 
background manifestations. 
Structural equation modeling analysis 
 This study aimed to develop and validate the new psychopathological-dynamic model 
for understanding BPD. To this end, the model was firstly developed in detail from a 
theoretical perspective. Secondly, it was validated administering a specific battery of tests to 
a sample of 105 patients, ascertained from inpatient and outpatient services, who met criteria 
for BPD as assessed by the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis II Disorders 
(SCID-II) (and compared to a sample of 105 healthy controls). The tests (comprising the 
Nepean Dysphoria Scale, the Situational Dysphoria Scale, the Cynical Distrust Scale, the 
Inventory of Interpersonal Problems-47, the Empathy Quotient, and the Borderline 
Personality Severity Index-IV), assessed, each, a specific dimension of the model 
(background dysphoria, negative interpersonal disposition with its subdimensions of hostile 
distrust, interpersonal sensitivity, and impaired empathy, situational dysphoria, and BPD 
symptoms). Then, data were analyzed through structural equation model analysis. 
 The results of the study seem to confirm the proposed model, even though some 
revision was needed. Specifically, the model had a close-to-acceptable fit in the BPD sample. 
In both the proposed and best-fitting structural models, background dysphoria and negative 
interpersonal disposition were significant predictors of situational dysphoria, which in turn 
was a significant predictor of organizing and disorganizing symptoms. This is consistent with 
both previous findings emphasizing the role of interpersonal sensitivity in the affective 
oscillations of BPD (Goodman et al., 2009) and with our hypothesis that there is an 
“interpersonal-affective specialty” in BPD, composed of background dysphoria, negative 
interpersonal disposition, and situational dysphoria. Moreover, background dysphoria, 
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negative interpersonal disposition, and situational dysphoria demonstrated discriminant 
validity and a moderate degree of correlation between them, thus confirming our hypothesis 
that they are related but different constructs. 
 Secondly, the two hypothesized pathways of symptomatic disturbances seemed to 
partially represent the variety of BPD manifestations but did not demonstrate discriminant 
validity, thus suggesting the need for revision. Particularly, (para)suicidal behaviors and other 
risky behaviors did not seem to fit in the organizing way of symptoms; identity disturbances 
and quasi-psychotic experiences did not seem to fit in the disorganizing way of symptoms. 
However, this could be due to the fact that the sample of BPD patients was ascertained from 
adult psychiatric outpatient services and residential inpatient communities, where they 
received psychopharmacological and psychotherapeutic treatments that could keep their most 
severe symptoms under control (i.e., suicidal and parasuicidal behaviors, and paranoid and 
dissociative experiences). For this reason, there is need to further test the model in a more 
heterogeneous sample of BPD patients comprising also borderline individuals who are 
currently not receiving treatment.  
 Thirdly, impaired empathy seemed not to be involved in the construct of negative 
interpersonal disposition, which appeared to be best represented only by hostile distrust and 
interpersonal sensitivity. However, this could be due to the complexity of the construct of 
empathy, which remains difficult to define, as it comprises both cognitive and emotional 
components (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). These two components cannot be easily 
separated but do not seem to be equally impaired in BPD, as reported in literature (the 
emotional components seem even more prominent, according to some studies; Frank & 
Hoffman, 1986), thus making the measure of the whole construct of empathy difficult to 
explore in such patients. This suggests the need to include other measures differentiating 
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between cognitive and emotional components of empathy in further studies in order to better 
explore the role of empathy in our model. 
 Fourthly, situational dysphoria, the newest construct in the model, appeared to be 
confirmed as composed of three sub-dimensions: internal pressure, urge to act, and quasi-
explosion. Including the three indicators of situational dysphoria actually improved model fit. 
It also made the path coefficient between negative interpersonal disposition and situational 
dysphoria significant. This is noteworthy because it confirms the construct validity of the 
instrument developed to measure situational dysphoria (the Situational Dysphoria Scale, 
SITDS), previously explored through exploratory factor analysis and hierarchical cluster 
analysis. Besides, it strengthens the argument that proximal mechanisms (i.e., contingent 
states triggered by everyday events), rather than distal mechanisms (i.e., genetic, cognitive, 
and environmental risk factors), have a crucial role in driving the acute, short-term 
occurrence of BPD symptoms, thus accounting for the individual variability in borderline 
manifestations, as in accordance with recent literature (Furr et al., in preparation; Miskewicz 
et al., 2015; Wright et al., 2015).  
 Finally, the model did not fit the healthy controls at all. This is important because the 
model was developed for a specific clinical population, those with BPD. That it fit only the 
BPD sample and not the sample of health controls shows that the model appeared to have 
discriminant validity. To further buttress the validity of the model, however, the model has to 
be tested with patients suffering from psychiatric disorders other than BPD. 
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Scala per la Disforia Situazionale  
(Situational Dysphoria Scale, SITDS) 
 
 
 
1 = Per nulla o quasi 2 = Poco 3 = Abbastanza 4 = Molto 5 = Moltissimo 
 
 
  Non 
accaduto 
Mi ha fatto sentire  
sotto pressione 
Mi ha fatto sentire una forte 
spinta a fare qualcosa 
Mi ha fatto sentire come 
se stessi per esplodere 
1. Ho fatto qualcosa che non ero qualificato a 
fare 
 
1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  
2.  Ho fatto male qualcosa per colpa di altre 
persone 
 
1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  
3. Sono stato interrotto mentre parlavo   1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  
4. Ho ottenuto scarsi risultati nello sport/gioco  1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  
5. Sono stato ignorato da altre persone  1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  
6. Mi è saltato un impegno importante   1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  
7. Mi sono messo nei guai con la legge   1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  
8. Ho litigato con il coniuge, compagno/a, etc.   1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  
Qui sotto troverà elencata una serie di eventi che possono accadere. Rifletta attentamente su ognuno di esse e indichi, per favore, se 
l’evento le è accaduto durante l’ultima settimana. Se l’evento non è accaduto in questa settimana, metta una X nella casella 
corrispondente. Se invece l’evento è accaduto in questa settimana, indichi con un punteggio da 1 a 5 quanto questo: 
- l’ha fatta sentire sotto pressione; 
- le ha fatto sentire una forte spinta a fare qualcosa; 
- l’ha fatta sentire come se stesse per esplodere. 
 
Utilizzi la seguente guida per le sue valutazioni. Grazie. 
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9. Sono arrivato tardi al lavoro/appuntamento 
a causa di un imprevisto  
 
1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  
10. Mi sono trovato esposto a una 
situazione/oggetto temuti  
 
1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  
11. Ho litigato con altre persone (collega, 
cliente, vicino, vigile urbano, etc.)  
 
1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  
12. Sono stato interrotto mentre pensavo o mi 
rilassavo  
 
1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  
13. Ho corso per rispettare una scadenza  1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  
14. Ho avuto un piccolo incidente (rotto 
qualcosa, etc) a causa di altre persone  
 
1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  
15. Ho avuto problemi con la macchina   1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  
16. Ho preso parte a una competizione  1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  
17. Ho avuto problemi di soldi per colpa di altre 
persone  
 
1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  
18. Ho guidato in cattive condizioni (traffico, 
maltempo, etc)  
 
1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  
19. Ho fatto qualcosa che non volevo fare  1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  
20. Ho dovuto affrontare spese non previste 
(multe, etc) a causa di altre persone  
 
1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  
21. Sono stato frainteso   1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  
22. Mi sono passati avanti mentre ero in fila  1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  
23. Qualcuno ha mandato all’aria il lavoro che 
avevo fatto  
 
1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  
24. Ho avuto una malattia o problema fisico  1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  
 
 
  94 
Descrizione e scoring 
 
 
 
La Scala per la Disforia Situazionale è un questionario autosomministrato, formato da 24 item, che misura lo stato di pressione, 
spinta all’azione, sensazione di stare sul punto di esplodere, che la persona ha esperito nell’ultima settimana in relazione a 
specifici eventi (personali, interpersonali, ambientali). Per ogni item, la persona deve indicare: I) se l’evento è accaduto 
nell’ultima settimana; II) se accaduto, quanto (su una scala da 1, per nulla o quasi, a 5, moltissimo) quell’evento: a) l’ha fatto 
sentire sotto pressione; b) le ha fatto sentire una forte spinta a fare qualcosa; c) lo ha fatto sentire sul punto di esplodere. 
 
[Disforia situazionale: stato di pressione interna, spinta all’azione, sensazione di stare sul punto di esplodere, caratterizzato da 
una marcata componente reattiva e dunque fortemente dipendente da eventi contingenti scatenanti (personali, interpersonali, 
ambientali]  
 
Gli item sono divisi in cluster diversi per tipologia di evento: 
1) Personali (PE, Personal Events): item 1-4-7-10-13-16-19 
2) Interpersonali (IE, Interpersonal Events): item 2-5-8-11-14-17-20-23 
3) Ambientali (EE, Environmental Events): item 3-6-9-12-15-18-21-22-24 
 
Ogni item viene valutato su 3 sottodimensioni: pressione, spinta (all’azione), quasi-esplosione. 
 
E’ possibile derivare dalla scala tre punteggi principali: 
1) Disforia situazionale (globale): somma dei punteggi ottenuti in tutti gli item su tutte e tre le dimensioni 
2) Disforia situazionale (dimensione-specifica): somma dei punteggi ottenuti in tutti gli item per ogni singola dimensione 
3) Disforia situazionale (evento-specifica): somma dei punteggi ottenuti negli item relativi a una delle tre tipologie di evento 
(personale, interpersonale, ambientale) su tutte e 3 le dimensioni 
 
 
 
NB: QUESTA ULTIMA PAGINA NON VA STAMPATA PER IL PARTECIPANTE! 
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Conclusions 
 
 Several theoretical and clinical implications can be gleaned from the results of this 
study. Firstly, the findings support a new, psychopathological-dynamic model that posited the 
BPD subjective experience to be an essential interpersonal and affective problem. This is in 
accordance with recent literature describing the borderline clinical core as being 
characterized by a specific form of emotional instability that is strongly dependent on the 
context (environmental relational, interpersonal) (Gratz et al., 2010; Gunderson &Lyons-
Ruth, 2008; Zanarini & Frankenburg, 1997, 2007).  
 Secondly, the results indicate that dysphoria, in contrast with the vagueness with 
which it is still described in psychiatric and clinical psychology literature (Starcevic, 2007; 
Starcevic et al., 2013), needs to be carefully assessed because it may capture different levels 
of the BPD patients’ subjective experience (basic lived experience or here-and-now lived 
experience). Also, the findings highlight the importance of both dispositional (background 
dysphoria and negative interpersonal disposition) and situational (situational dysphoria) 
factors in BPD. Working on these levels from a therapeutic point of view could be helpful in 
preventing the development of symptomatic disturbances. 
 One of the major limitations of this study was the fact that the BPD participants 
represented only a specific portion of borderline variety (that is, patients ascertained from 
inpatient and outpatient services, and so were under current psychopharmacological and/or 
psychotherapeutic treatment). This may affect the generalizability of the results to the broader 
population of borderline patients, thus making the inclusion of those who are not currently 
receiving treatment (and so with probably a severe dysfunction still present) a priority in 
future tests of the model. Moreover, the relatively small sample size is likely to have 
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influenced the power of the statistical analyses, even though such (or less large) sample sizes 
are not uncommon in studies of BPD (Linehan et al., 1991; Low et al., 2001; Verheul et al., 
2003). Lastly, the use of self-report measures (of which one, the Situational Dysphoria Scale, 
was created ad hoc for this study), helpful in speeding the test administration in clinical 
contexts, could have affected the results, as such measures are limited by participants’ 
subjective interpretations. 
Future research should further investigate the model in a larger BPD sample with a 
more broad level of functioning. In fact, as previously shown, the borderline 
psychopathology is so multifaceted that it can be compared to a “condominium”. Using 
Kernberg’ theory of personality organization, mental capacity of the tenants on upper floors 
(i.e., patients with low BPD severity) is equivalent to neurotic functioning, while mental 
operations of the tenants on lower floors (i.e., patients with high BPD severity) is akin to 
psychotic functioning (Rossi Monti & D’Agostino, 2009). Taking into account the individual 
differences within BPD may help to improve the accuracy of the model in sketching a portrait 
of borderline patients that is as realistic as possible. 
Moreover, future research should test the model with the organizing and disorganizing 
pathways of symptoms revised. Below, we propose a possible, alternative route to do. 
Organizing pathway of symptoms may be subdivided into two further paths: a) relational 
path, comprising behaviors oriented to the others, such as fears of abandonment, outbursts of 
anger, and stormy relationships; b) impulsive path, comprising impulsive behaviors, such as 
suicide and parasuicide, and other risky behaviors. Similarly, disorganizing pathway of 
symptoms may be subdivided into two further paths: a) affective path, comprising affective 
oscillations, such as affective shifts and emptiness; b) cognitive and self-related path, 
comprising cognitive and identity-related symptoms, such as identity disturbances and quasi-
psychotic experiences. 
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This revised part of the model could be seen as a slightly different outcome of the 
gunshots in the metaphor of the BPD patient as a individual having a gun and bullets 
available discussed in Chapter 2. If he/she gets to the point of shooting, it can happen that 
some gunshots hit some targets out of him/her (organizing pathway of symptoms), aiming at 
someone in particular (relational path) or hitting something/harming oneself without thinking 
too much (impulsive path). Instead, some other gunshots have not the strength to hit 
something outside of him/herself and make just him/her loose balance (disorganizing 
pathway of symptoms); in this case he/she can only hit his/her foot (cognitive path) or misfire 
and fall to the ground (affective path) due to the recoil of the shot fired. In both cases the 
patient has lowered the internal pressure, thus coming back to the baseline state, that of 
having a gun and bullets available for the next shoot. 
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